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Carlton Waterhouse*
I. INTRODUCTION - THE INFERNO
Midway through life's journey and a few years hence, it came to
me to inquire of the state of those I had encountered sometime before in the wood of error before I had sought to ascend to the mount
of joy. At that time, I traveled the wood in the hope of aiding those
attacked by the offspring of two great beasts. In days past, three
beasts ruled the wood attacking and ravaging countless souls both
young and old. One beast, displayed many colors and had exceedingly long claws with which it scarred and disfigured some and destroyed others. Its teeth were exceedingly sharp and those suffering
its bite new pain and death. This beast was called Sexism. The second beast was pale in color with a sweeping gate. It placed many
souls in fear and inspired great terror through its roar. Those who
opposed it and the entire wood knew its might and its power to destroy. Through its teeth, it killed instantly and by practice it displayed the carcass of those it destroyed for all to see. Racism was
the title given to it. A third beast also prowled the wood and by its
great tail it swept its prey from their feet and trampled them under
foot; grinding their faces into the dirt with its immense hooves. This
third beast was the oldest of the beasts. It was arrayed with many

* Carlton Waterhouse, Associate Professor of Law, Florida International
University, College of Law; B.A. Penn State University; J.D. Howard University;

M.T.S. Emory University; Ph.D. Emory University. Words are inadequate to express my gratitude to all of those who aided me in the preparation of this Article,
but I would especially like to thank Stanley Fish, Sheila Foster, and Kerri Stone
for their thoughtful consideration of earlier drafts, and Thomas Baker for his
thoughtful insights into the project. My thanks also extend to Valquisha Morris,

Shannon O'Shea, and Allison Leonard for the critical research assistance they
provided.

52

FORDHAMENVIRONMENTAL LAWREVIEW

[VOL. XX

colors and fat from the many souls it devoured. All knew it as Poverty.
From time to time, cadres of warriors joined together to oppose
one or the other beasts and in my youth hunters of stout heart assailed the second beast and drove it back to the shadows from
whence it still strikes. To prevail against this second beast these
great hunters fashioned special weapons that could wound the beast
and decrease its power. Though more fleet of foot and elusive, the
first beast also succumbed to an onslaught of hunters and yielded
territory it formerly controlled. Alas, because of its age and past
failures against it, many accepted the reign of the third beast saying
"this beast shall always be with us we can at best avoid it ourselves
and possibly aid its victims."
Unbeknownst to some, these three beasts yielded two offspring.
Though mighty like their predecessors, the offspring had small stature and narrow gaits. They left faint tracks that seemed as those of
the older beasts, so many doubted that offspring were sired. The
doubters claimed that the first beast with its many colors and long
claws fell upon the supposed victims of the offspring or that it was
the third beast that all should avoid who had attacked them. Yet, the
victims knew that offspring prowled the wood and that these creatures daily devoured their kindred. The two offspring traveled to
together sometimes sharing prey. The larger of the offspring had
many colors, long claws, and a great tail. On either of its two heads
were written "sexism" and "poverty" and on its underbelly "environmental destruction." Its sibling was pale in color with long claws
and sharp teeth. Like the larger creature it also had two heads. On
one head was written "racism" and on the other "sexism" and on its
underbelly "environmental destruction."
In days now past, I was called to join the hunt against this second
creature. Though I and my associates were few we were confident
that we could track this creature and cut back its territory. Armed
with two of the weapons that prevailed against the second beast, a
lance dubbed "Equal Protection" and a sword called "Title VI," I and
my colleagues rode the wood to respond to cries for aide. Sadly, we
didn't know that the creature we hunted was immune from the
weapons that had diminished the power of the second beast, but we
soon find out that neither "Equal Protection" nor "Title VI" stood
much hope against the creature its victims called "environmental
racism."
If you are a person who is squeamish about issues of race, perhaps
you should stop reading here. The remainder of this article talks
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specifically about the relationship between race law and environmental protection. I recognize up front that in some minds this subject warrants less consideration and exploration as the cynical views
of a privileged law professor whining about the supposed but more
likely imagined injustices against racial minorities; a subject that is1
uninteresting in the minds of many of our nation's racial majority.
Others' distaste for the subject matter may rest in its seeming irrelevance to the important subject of environmental protection that
places vast human and animal populations at risk through phenomena like global climate change. Such readers may feel, as one of my
former students, that cries for environmental justice threaten all people's well being by distracting us from the life and death issues facing the entire planet. If you fit either of these two descriptions you
should probably put down this article to save yourself time. On the
other hand, if you keep reading you may find, as Dante, that even a
distasteful journey may carry great benefits. 2
Mounting environmental challenges command an ever increasing
prominence within American society. Unbeknownst to most Americans, decision makers at all levels of government have routinely
formulated and implemented environmental decisions that affected
local communities, the nation, and the globe. For some communities, those decisions increased pollution exposure, health risks, road
hazards, odors, and blight while for other communities environmental policies maintained or created greenways, walking trails,
convenient transportation options, and increased environmental quality. The difference between the decisions can sometimes be explained by race, other times by income, and frequently by a combination of the two.
This article explores the attempts to use civil rights law as a means
of addressing racial bias, perceived and otherwise, in environmental
decision making. Its primary contribution is its development and use
of an "environmental racism" rubric to explain why civil rights
based challenges to pollution permits and waste facility siting decisions have uniformly failed in the federal courts. Pending congressional legislation, the article concludes, offers little assistance to
community members concerned about the effects of additional pollution sources in their neighborhoods. If congress intends to aide
1. See JOE FEAGIN, RACIST AMERICA:
FUTURE REPARATIONS (Routledge ed. 2001).

2. See DANTE ALIGHIERI,
ed., Bantam Dell 1982) (1314).

ROOTS, CURRENT REALITIES, AND

INFERNO: THE DIVINE COMEDY

(Bantam Classics
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communities facing racially discriminatory and adverse effects from
polluting facilities the article maintains that comprehensive legislative action is needed. At a minimum, the article contends, Congress
should legislatively overturn Alexander v. Sandoval in the environmental context and allow private citizens to enforce EPA's Title VI
regulations. The article attempts this in five parts.
Part two provides historical background on the American race
problem. Through an examination of concerns raised by Dr. Martin
Luther King Jr. in 1967 that many forms of racial bias present in the
nation's cities remained unabated despite the promulgation of civil
rights legislation. The Kerner Commission echoed these concerns in
their now famous report issued in 1968. The special panel was
commissioned by President Lyndon Johnson the previous year to
determine the cause of racial unrest and urban rioting in America's
cities. Like Dr. King's remarks, the Commissions' findings reflect
and foreshadow the limited success of existing civil rights law to
address some of the nations' most basic racial ills.
Part three reviews federal cases that involved challenges to the environmental decisions of state and local officials. The courts in these
cases almost uniformly reject claims of racial discrimination under
the Equal Protection Clause of the United States Constitution or Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. By surveying the range of
cases and facts giving rise to claims, this part shows courts' denial of
"environmental racism" claims across an assortment of facts.
Part four of the article explains the failure of "environmental racism" claims in the courts. To accomplish this, the section shows
that the court's decisions in these cases cohere when viewed through
the veil of Democratic Process and Motive Review theory. This insight finds additional support when considered in light of the "Perpetrator's Perspective" of antidiscrimination law and the ethnic competition model of racial disparity used by the Supreme Court in its racial discrimination jurisprudence. This section culminates with the
development of an environmental racism rubric that identifies the
characteristics of the environmental racism cases most likely to succeed and to fail.
In Part five, the article examines a recent follow up to the original
Kerner Report forty years after its issuance. The findings of significant racial segregation in housing and education in American cities
are then related to the limitations of civil rights legislation identified
by Dr. King and the original Kemer Commission. The section investigates the society's and the courts' interest in addressing envi-
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ronmental injustices that merely reflect the de facto segregation accepted in housing and education.
Part six explores pending legislation on "environmental justice" in
the United States Congress and its potential for resolving communities concerns. The proposed legislation builds on Executive Order
12898, issued by President William Clinton, as a means to address
human and environmental inequities that result from federal programs, policies, or procedures.
The article concludes with recommendations for Congressional action that addresses the challenges posed by the issue of "environmental racism."
II. THROUGH THE GATES OF HELL

During the latter part of the Civil Rights Movement, the Southern
Christian Leadership Conference (SCLC) expanded their campaigns
beyond the borders of the Jim Crow South into the north and the
west. 3 Chicago, Illinois stood as the focus of SCLC and Dr. King's
attention.4 In an effort to build on the successes gained against Jim
Crow segregation in the South and by the passage of civil rights legislation proscribing discrimination in public accommodations, employment, and voting, civil rights workers hoped to end the discrimination in housing and education faced by African-Americans
living on the Westside of Chicago. 5 At the end of the campaign,
King and the civil rights workers left Chicago with a real sense of
despair. 6 Despite their significant investment of time and resources,
African Americans living on Chicago's Westside still faced de facto

3. See STEPHEN B. OATEs, LET THE TRUMPET SOUND: A LiFE OF MARTIN
LUTHER KING, JR. 376-79 (Harper Collins Publishers 1994) (1982).
4. See id. at 379-80.

5. See id. at387.
6. See id. at 417-18. A similar phenomenon had taken place a few years
before in Albany, GA. This campaign, which took place immediately before the
success of Birmingham, failed due to the courteous treatment and planning of the
white Police Chief Laurie Pritchett. Despite Pritchett's courteous treatment and
the absence of overt venom by his men that characterized so much of the South,
African-Americans in Albany still suffered daily from the effects of racist policies
and practices. Nonetheless, due to the lack of opprobrium and overt racial animus
displayed toward King and other civil rights workers, the campaign failed to engender the same support from the justice department and the courts that SCLC
gained in other campaigns. Id. at 191-95.
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segregation in their schools and in housing. 7 Moreover, efforts by
King and others to address these problems received little sympathy
from whites. 8 In fact, polls of the time showed that "85 percent of
white Americans believed that Negroes were demanding too much,
going to far...,9 In fact, the Village of Arlington Heights case itself
took place in one of the Chicago's suburban neighborhoods marked
by de facto segregation. 10 The Court, however, like the power structure faced by King and others could find no fault with the North's
"neutral" public policies that resulted in the adversity faced by
blacks. 1 King recognized this toward the end of the Civil Rights
Movement and expressed his frustration with the intractable de facto
segregation experienced by the millions of blacks living outside of
the South. 12 He confessed that the successes of the first decade of
the movement misled everyone about the depth of anger suppressed
by northern blacks and "the amount of bigotry" that America's white
majority disguised. 13 "The white power structure is still seeking to
he
keep the walls of segregation and inequality substantially intact"
14
death.
his
before
months
short
few
a
just
explained in 1967,
Earlier the same year, President Lyndon B. Johnson had established a national Advisory Commission on Civil Disorders, popularly known as the Kerner Commission. 15 In 1968, the Commission
provided its findings; as a result of its study the eleven member
group reached the conclusion that "Our nation is moving toward two
societies, one black, one white - separate and unequal."' 6 Further,
the report found the following:
7. See id
8. See id. at 418.

9. Id.
10. See id; see also Viii. of Arlington Heights v. Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp., 429
U.S. 252, 255 (1977) (During the 1960s, Arlington Heights experienced considerable growth, but the population of its racial minority groups remained low. In
1970, the population of the Village included 64,000 residents; however, only 27 of
the residents were black).
11. Id. at 270-71.
12. See DAVID GARROW, BEARING THE CROSS 581 (William Morrow & Co.,
Inc. 1986)
13. Id.
14. Id.
15. See NAT'L ADVISORY COMM'N ON CIVIL DISORDERS, SUMMARY OF
REPORT, REPORT OF THE NATIONAL ADVISORY COMM'N ON CIVIL DISORDERS 609

(Bantam Books
docs/Kemer.pdf.
16. Id.

1968),

available at http://www.eisenhowerfoundation.org/
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Segregation and poverty have created in the racial ghetto
a destructive environment totally unknown to most white
Americans. What white Americans have never fully understood-but what the Negro can never forget-is that
white society is deeply implicated in the ghetto. White
institutions created it, white
institutions maintain it, and
17
white society condones it.
Like the Commission, King believed that racism caused the urban
unrest of the time. 18 In light of those realities, King realized that the
desegregation campaigns in the South and the legal victories that
accompanied them were limited achievements in light of the problems facing millions of blacks in America's cities.' 9 Today, environmental justice activists and others face the same battle against
apathy and facially neutral policies that relegate African-Americans
and other racial minorities to bear disproportionate pollution burdens
with the acceptance of federal and state law officials. This struggle
began when claims of "environmental racism" surfaced in the 1970s.
EnvironmentalJustice Background
The environmental justice movement began as a continuation of
the civil rights movement, and focused on the prevalence of racism
in the environmental arena. Its national prominence can be traced to
Warren County, North Carolina, which under the leadership of Congressman Walter Fauntleroy mirrored the "campaigns" of the civil
rights movement.
Organizers fighting against the placement of a
hazardous waste landfill in the area protested and used civil disobedience to challenge what they understood was "environmental racism. ' 21 After a truck driver traversed the state from the northern to
the southern border and back again discharging waste oils along the
shoulders of Interstate Highway 85, state officials decided to place a
toxic waste landfill in Warren County to hold the contaminated soils
17. Id.
18. See infra note 161, at 600, 609.

19. See id.
at 581.
20. Walter Fauntleroy, the non-voting delegate to the United States House of
Representatives for the District of Columbia, was a former civil rights organizer
and lieutenant of Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr.
21. ROBERT BULLARD, DUMPING IN DIXIE: RACE, CLASS, AND ENVTL.
QUALITY

31 (Westview Press 2000).
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gathered from across the state. 22 Protestors challenged the action as
racism because the site selected was in the county with the largest
black population of the state near a black residential area. 23 Congressman Fauntleroy was arrested along with 500 others during the
protest. Upon his return to Washington he requested a General Acof comcounting Office (GAO) study examining the demographics
24
munities with hazardous waste sites in the southeast.
The 1985 GAO study found that three out of five hazardous waste
landfills in the southeast region were located in predominantly black
It was soon followed by a 1987 report, entitled
or Latino areas.
"Toxic Waste and Race" by the Commission for Racial Justice of the
United Church of Christ. 2 6 That report was more extensive than the
GAO study.27 It looked at the list of uncontrolled toxic waste sites
contained in the Environmental Protection Agency Comprehensive
Environmental Response, Compensation and Liability Information
System (CERCLIS) database and mapped them unto zip codes
Using census data, the study then correlated
across the country.
the zip codes with waste sites and the demographic data for nearby
residents. 29 Beyond analyzing the racial makeup of residents, the
study also examined residential income to assess its relative significance in the location of waste sites. 30 Report author, Charles Lee,
and others, reported in the study that regardless of their income African-Americans disproportionately lived in zip codes with uncon-

22. See id. at 30. Over 30,000 gallons of PCB-laced oil was dumped and left
on the side of over 210 miles of road in North Carolina for four years before the
state and the EPA began clean up efforts. Id.
23. See id. Warren County was more than 84% black at the time. Id.
24. See U.S. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE (GAO), SITING OF HAZARDOUS
WASTE LANDFILLS AND THEIR CORRELATION

WITH RACIAL AND ECONOMIC

available
(June
1, 1983),
CMTYS.
SURROUNDING
STATUS OF
l3/121648.pdf (last visited Feb. 27, 2009).
http://archive.gao.gov/d48t
25. See id.
26. CHARLES LEE, COMM'N FOR
THE U.S.:
A NAT'L REPORT

at

RACIAL JUSTICE, TOXIC WASTES AND RACE IN
ON THE RACIAL AND SOCIOECONOMIC
CHARACTERISTICS OF CMTYS. WITH HAZARDOUS WASTES SITES (United Church of

Christ 1987).
27. Id.

28. Id.
29. Id.
30. See id.
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trolled toxic waste sites. 31 Within a year, a book by sociologist
Robert Bullard of the Clark Atlanta University in Atlanta, Georgia,
entitled "Dumping in Dixie" provided an academic examination of a
historic and continuing phenomenon that relegated many undesirable
waste disposal and polluting facilities to predominantly black areas.
With the GAO study, Commission for Racial Justice report, and Professor Bullard's book bolstering their claims, local activists and
more prominent civil rights leaders began to draw attention to racial
disparities in the siting of pollution related facilities. 32 In response
to growing awareness and pressure, in 1990, Environmental Protection Agency (hereinafter "EPA") Administrator William Reilly,
commissioned an agency task force to determine what relationship
existed between race and pollution. 33 Rejecting the activists' claims
that EPA and others participated in environmental racism; the Administrator adopted the name "Environmental Equity" to describe
the concerns raised by activists. 34
Because the southeast region represented a focal point of environmental racism claims, the EPA's Region Four office in Atlanta became a major battlefield in the controversy. When the EPA's Draft
Environmental Equity report was issued in 1992, the author had been
an attorney in the EPA Region Four Office of Regional Counsel for
less than one year. Coinciding with the issuance of the report, regional personnel and local organizers convened a meeting of activists from across the region to come and discuss their concerns with
EPA personnel. 35 At the well-attended meeting, one of the concerns
raised was the EPA's decision to36 study "environmental equity" instead of "environmental racism."
Though couched in semantic terms, this disagreement reflected a
fundamental difference in the understanding that they and the EPA
31. See id. Charles Lee currently serves as the deputy director of the EPA's
Office of Envtl. Justice and chair of the EPA's National Envtl. Justice Advisory
Council.
32. See Lee, supra note 26.
33. See U.S. ENvTL. PROT. AGENCY [hereinafter EPA], ENVTL. EQUITY:

REDUCING
RISKS
FOR ALL CMTYS.
(June,
1992), available at
http://www.epa.gov/compliance/resources/publications/ej/reducingriskcomvol
1.pdf (last visited Feb. 27, 2009).
34. See id.
35. See Press Release, EPA, Release of Envtl. Equity Report (July 22, 1992)
availableat http://www.epa.gov/history/topics/justice/Ol.htm (last visited Feb. 27,
2009).
36. Id.
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had over the issue. Activists felt that race affected the decisions of
corporations and state officials in choosing sites for unwanted pollution. Though activists lacked direct evidence of racial animus, they
believed that the disparity in siting shown by the preceding studies
and their own experience confirmed the phenomenon. On the other
hand, the EPA's position reflected the view that racism was a
charged word and that the behavior of their grant recipients, personnel, and others should not be so described absent clear evidence to
that effect. The disagreement escalated when the director of the
Commission for Racial Justice, Benjamin Chavis Jr., popularized the
phrase "environmental racism." 37 The issue continued to play out in
the following three new contexts: studies contesting racial disparity
in siting, federal court cases brought under the Equal Protection
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and Title VI of the Civil
Rights Act, and administrative complaints filed with the EPA alleging Title VI violations by EPA grant recipients. 38 Nonetheless, both
the EPA and activists accepted "Environmental Justice" to describe
their concern and the apparent disagreement faded. 39
The EPA created an Office of Environmental Justice in the agency
Administrator's Office. It was tasked with investigating the issue
and educating agency personnel on how to approach citizens' concerns. The first director, Clarice Gaylord, had a Ph.D. in atmospheric science and brought a scientific perspective and background
to the issue. She was assisted in the task with corresponding regional directors. In Region Four, where a substantial number of
"environmental justice" hot spots existed, Vivian Malone Jones was
hired to direct the office. 40 A love-hate relationship soon developed
37. Rachel D. Godsil, Remedying Envtl. Racism, 90 MICH. L. REv. 394, 395
(1991) (Chavis using the term "environmental racism" to refer to both the intentional and the unintentional disproportionate imposition of environmental hazards
on minorities). The EPA uses the term "environmental justice" to refer to the fair
treatment of all people, no matter what their race, color, national origin, or income
level, in the development, implementation, and enforcement of environmental
laws, regulations, and policies. See Tom Stephens, An Overview of Envtl. Justice,
20 T.M. COOLEY L. REv. 229,231 (2003).
38. See infra Part II.
39. See Stephens, supranote 37, at 231.
40. Unlike Dr. Gaylord, Ms. Jones' background was in civil rights. Best
known for integrating the University of Alabama despite George Wallace's personal refusal to deny her entrance to the University, Ms. Jones provided the
agency with a level of credibility in dealing with a new breed of environmental
activists. Now deceased, Ms. Jones served as director from 1992 to 1996. During
this time, the author served as the primary contact and support for the Regional
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as William Clinton was elected President of the United States, and
the EPA announced that "environmental justice" was one of its top
five priorities. 4 1 The EPA soon became the agency that environmental justice activists loved to hate. Serving as a clearinghouse for
activists to voice their concerns, the EPA modified many of its policies and practices of community relations and took substantial
strides to give voice to the concerns raised by "EJ communities."
The agency provided numerous grants, sponsored several conferences and created a National Environmental Justice Advisory Council (NEJAC) to inform the agency on ways to achieve its environmental justice goals.42
One of the greatest benefits of these developments was the raised
awareness gained by Native American, African-American, Latino,
and other community members near Superfund sites and other pollution related facilities. During this time period, communities began to
share stories, ideas, and knowledge to assist each other in learning
about the risks they faced and the tools to decrease or eliminate
them. In 1994, President William Clinton supported these developments across the federal government by issuing Executive Order
12898, directing federal agencies to identify and address disproportionately high and adverse human health effects affecting minority
and low income populations.43
Under this regime, environmental justice became an exercise in
44
community relations for the EPA, state agencies, and corporations.
Office of Envtl. Justice and the lead attorney addressing "environmental justice"
issues for the Region.
41. See Carol M. Browner, Adm'r of the EPA, Statement Before the U.S. Senate Comm. on Finance, 106th Cong. (Jan. 28, 1999), available at
http://www.epa.gov/ocir/hearings/testimony/106_ 1999_2000/012899cb.htm.
42. See EILEEN P. GAUNA & CLIFFORD RECHTSCHAFFEN, ENVTL. JUSTICE:
LAW, POLICY AND REGULATION

(Carolina Academic Press 2002) (describing the

history of National Envtl. Justice Advisory Council.).
43. See Meredith J. Bowers, The Executive's Response to Envtl. Injustice:
Executive Order 12,898 1 ENvTL. LAW. 645 (Feb., 1995).
44. In the absence of either legislation or case law supporting reform in the
legal and regulatory regime governing the vast majority of environmental decisions, Executive Order 12898 provided enough authority to raise public expectations but not to raise the level of environmental protection for minority communities. In fact, to date the EPA has never implemented the primary directive of the
Executive Order to "identify and address the disproportionately high and adverse
human health effects of its programs and procedures on low income and minority
populations." A 2004 EPA IG report concludes that the EPA "has not developed a
clear vision or a comprehensive strategic plan, and has not established values,
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Rather than the development of an environmental policy that attended to the alleged disparity in pollution exposure, the environmental justice movement raised the awareness of community members concerning their role in environmental decision-making and
forced agency officials to develop a more effective means of dealing
with the concerns of "minority" and "low income" populations. This
represented a genuine improvement over the status quo. In fact, at
the local level the environmental justice movement has provided
well organized communities with access to funds, education, resources and great deal more respect and consideration from public
officials and corporations. 45 Unfortunately, the fundamental discord
remained and today represents the primary basis of federal courts' all
but unanimous rejection of environmental justice claims under both
the Fourteenth Amendment and Title VI. Moreover, the EPA's
failure to find a single Title VI violation by any of its grant recipients since its 1997 decision to dedicate staff and resources to investigating Title VI complaints flows from the same discord.
However, while environmental justice was gaining notoriety and
recognition through the 1980s and early 1990s, a different movement
was transpiring in the federal courts. President Reagan's appointment of Justices Antonin Scalia and Sandra Day O'Connor to the
goals, expectations, and performance measurements" to meet the directive. See
EPA OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL [OIG], EVALUATION REPORT: EPA NEEDS
TO CONSISTENTLY IMPLEMENT THE INTENT OF THE EXECUTIVE ORDER ON ENVTL.
Report No. 2004-P-00007 (Mar. 1, 2004), available at
JUSTICE,

http://www.epa.gov/oig/reports/2004/20O40301-2004-P-00007.pdf; A 2006 Report
finds that the Agency has also failed to conduct Environmental Justice reviews of

its programs as required by the Executive Order. EPA-OIG, EVALUATION

REPORT:
NEEDS TO CONDUCT ENVTL. JUSTICE REVIEWS OF ITS PROGRAMS, POLICIES
AND ACTIVITIES (R. 21.8.5), Report No. 2006-P-00034 (Sept. 18, 2006), available

EPA

at http://www.epa.gov/oig/reports/2006/20060918-2006-P-00034.pdf.
45. The evacuation of residents located near the "Mount Dioxin" Superfund
site in Pensacola, Florida, is a good example. See Sandra L. Geiger, An Alternative Legal Toolfor PursuingEnvtl. Justice: The Takings Clause, 31 COLUM. J.L.
& SOC. PROBS. 201, 221 (1998). In 1991, the EPA began what would become a
five year evaluation process to assess whether an abandoned wood-treating facility
posed a significant enough hazard to relocate the predominantly black families
living in the area. See id. In light of evidence linking the residents' health problems to exposure to dioxin, arsenic and other chemicals from the facility, the EPA
determined that it would be more cost effective to permanently relocate the residents. See id. The federal government gave each family cash for their home (calculated using the fair market value) and relocation costs. See id. This relocation
program helped to expand the option for people who would normally not have the
resources to leave. See id.

2009] ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE AND EQUAL PROTECTION

63

bench, Clarence Thomas to head the Equal Employment and Opportunity Commission, and a slew of federal court judges who were
openly hostile to race based civil rights claims signaled the end of
the expansion of civil rights coverage for racial minorities that began
in the mid 1960s and the onset of a contraction of race based opportunities. 46 During this period, the federal courts, under the leadership of the Supreme Court, consistently erected greater burdens on
parties seeking to remedy racial discrimination. Moreover, the U.S.
Department of Justice, under Attorney General Edwin Meese, had so
changed its position on race based discrimination that it switched
sides in prominent cases to oppose its former position. 47 Accordingly, the expansion of civil rights protection to racial minorities in
the environmental context had little hope of finding succor in the
federal courts.4 8
III. DOWN INTO THE ABYSS

- CIVIL RIGHTS CASES AND

ENVIRONMENTAL DECISIONS

A.

The FourteenthAmendment Equal Protection Clause Cases

Despite the ongoing contraction of race based civil rights claims
and remedies in the federal courts during the 1980s, early activists
and others increasingly brought suits claiming violations of the
Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. 49 These
suits alleged that state agencies sited waste facilities in predominantly black and Latino areas and that racial disparity and inequality

46. See KIMBERLE WILLIAMS CRENSHAW, Demarginalizingthe Intersection of
Race and Sex: A Black Feminist Critique ofAntidiscriminationDoctrine,Feminist
Theory and Antiracist Politics, in FEMINIST LEGAL THEORY: READINGS IN LAW
AND GENDER 57-80 (Katherine Bartlett and Rose Kennedy eds., Westview Press
1991).
47. See William A. Wines, Title VII Interpretation and Enforcement in the
Reagan Years (1980-89): The Winding Road to the Civil Rights Act of 1991, 77
MARQ. L. REV. 645,673 (1995).
48. See generally Suzanne Smith, Current Treatment of Envtl. Justice Claims:
PlaintiffsFace a DeadEnd in the Courtroom, 12 B. U. PUB. INT. L. J. 223 (2002).
49. The Fourteenth Amendment states in relevant part that "[n]o State shall...
deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws." U.S.
CONST.

amend. XIV, § 1.
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were characteristic of environmental decision-making. 50
These
claims were uniformly unsuccessful; yet, some consideration of the
handful of cases will help demonstrate the substance of my claim
that federal courts will not recognize "environmental racism" claims
under the Fourteenth Amendment absent a strong showing of the
type of "racial animus" typically associated with the actions of Bull
Connor and other white segregationists. 51
In Bean v. Southwestern Waste Management Corporation,plaintiffs alleged that the Texas Department of Health's (TDH) issuance
of a permit continued a historical pattern and practice of disproportionately siting waste facilities in and around African American
neighborhoods.52
As evidence, plaintiffs identified the racial
makeup of the areas proximate to both the proposed and the existing
waste facilities.53 The evidence provided by the plaintiffs included
sites permitted by the Texas Department of Water Resources
(TDWR) and the TDH. 54 However, the plaintiffs' concerns accordingly stemmed from the data showing the disparity in facility locations affecting nearby African Americans. 5
Under the court's
analysis, the relevant facilities only related to the actions of the TDH
because they could only be responsible for their own actions. 56 After removing the TDWR sites from the data set, the court found that
no statistically significant disparity existed in the location of waste
sites.5 7 The court further broke down the plaintiffs' claim by rejecting their method of analyzing the alleged disparate impact.5 While
the plaintiffs focused on the racial makeup of communities and parts
of town, the court looked to census tracts to define the relevant statistical data.59 The court rejected the plaintiffs' request for a pre50. Donna Gareis-Smith, Envtl. Racism: The Failureof Equal Prot. to Provide a JudicialRemedy and the Potentialof Title VI of the 1964 Civil Rights Act,
13 TEMP. ENvTL. L. & TECH. J. 57, 65-70 (1994).
5 1. See infra Part IV.
52. Bean v. Sw. Waste Mgmt. Corp., 482 F. Supp. 673, 677-79 (Tex. 1979).
This case launched the career of Robert Bullard, the leading scholar in the environmental justice field and the director of the Clark Atlanta Univ. Envtl. Justice

Resource Center.
53. Id. at 677-79.
54. Id.

55.
56.
57.
58.
59.

Id.
Id.
Id. at 679.
Id.
Id; see also infra Part III for a discussion of analytical methods.
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liminary injunction to stop the location of the new landfill across
from a predominantly black high school in the black residential area
of Northwood Manor 60in Houston ruling plaintiffs were unlikely to
succeed on the merits.
This case and its outcome underscores one of the many problems
faced by environmental justice litigants. Rather than examining how
current and past governmental decisions collectively create adverse
disparate impacts on minority populations, contemporary equal protection jurisprudence focuses on the motivation of a single entity to
assess whether a constitutional violation took place. 6 1 Following the
racial discrimination analysis proffered by the Supreme Court in the
Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Development
Corporation,courts seek to uncover some hidden impermissible motive. 62 Environmental justice claimants, however, focus on the results of government decisions that disproportionately burden them. 63
As in Bean above, litigants' concerns flow from the outcome of numerous decisions that now adversely affect them. 64 In their views,
race played an impermissible role in the outcome of numerous decisions that reflect a lower standard of care and protection afforded
them. 65 While courts may find these alleged injustices unfortunate,
they do not view them as rising to the level of an impermissible government action. 66 Accordingly, claimants have had little hope of
prevailing under civil rights based laws. Novel interpretations of
existing civil rights statutes provide no better chances for litigants
because their legal theories represent fundamental
disagreements
67
law.
rights
civil
of
function
and
purpose
the
about

60.

ROBERT

D.

BULLARD, UNEQUAL PROT.: ENvTL. JUSTICE AND CMTYS. OF

COLOR 4 (Random House, Inc. 1997).

61. Bean, 482 F. Supp. at 673.
62. Viii. of Arlington Heights v. Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252
(1977). Strangely, in the thirty years since its adoption the Court has rarely found
racial discrimination using the analysis, including the case in which it was developed. In practice, the test legitimates suspect decisions by making disparity analysis a less significant part of the equal protection analysis. Id. at 266.
63. Consider the Warren County protests, and the studies by the GAO and the
UCC Commission on Racial Justice, pointing out disparities in the location of
hazardous and toxic waste.
64. Bean, 482 F. Supp. at 673, 677-79.
65. LUKE COLE & SHEILA FOSTER, FROM THE GROUND UP: ENVTL. RACISM
AND THE RISE OF THE ENVTL. JUSTICE MOVEMENT 70-74 (NYU Press 2000).
66. Bean, 482 F. Supp. at 679.
67. See infra Part III.
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The foregoing decision demonstrates the way equal protection
analysis has often been interpreted by the courts.6 8 Unlike statutory
interpretation, equal protection analysis flows almost exclusively
from the standards imposed by the federal courts. Accordingly, despite the provision, injustices to blacks and other racial minorities
passed legal scrutiny like in the form of prohibitions on interracial
marriage, integrated schools, integrated railway cars, and other Jim
Crow laws. 69 The Courts' subsequent decisions to the contrary in
the wake of Brown v. Board of Education flowed from the changed
racial sensibility of the nation rather than any substantive legal necessity. 70 In this regard, blacks and other racial minorities have historically had to wait for white sensibilities to change in order for
them to enjoy many legal protections today taken for granted. 7 ' In
light of such a contingent jurisprudential history, claimants should
not view equal protection jurisprudence as fixed or preordained but
as a reflection of the contemporary norms of the society. 72 Accordingly, environmental justice claimants should make note of the contemporary societal bias against race based antidiscrimination law
when evidence of racial animus is absent.7 3 The series of federal
cases examined below each analyzed environmental decisions for
possible violations of the Equal Protection Clause.
I next consider East Bibb Twiggs Neighborhood Association v.
Macon-Bibb County Planning& Zoning Commission.74 In this case,
the court reviewed the actions of a local zoning commission that approved the placement of an additional waste facility in a predominantly black community. 75 Plaintiffs contended that a historic prac76
tice existed of placing unwanted land uses in black communities.
Specifically, plaintiffs challenged the placement of a landfill in a

68. See Vill. of Arlington Heights v. Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252

(1977).
69. See Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896).
70. Derrick A. Bell, Brown v. Board of Ed. and the Interest-ConvergenceDilemma, 93 HARV. L.REV. 518, 521 (1980).

71. Id.
72. Id.
73. See infra Part Il.
74. E. Bibb Twiggs Neighborhood Ass'n v. Macon-Bibb County Planning &
Zoning Comm'n, 706 F. Supp. 880 (M.D. Ga. 1989), ajfd., 896 F.2d 1264 (11th
Cir. 1989).

75. Id.
76. Id
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majority black census tract.77 Despite the disparate impact allegations of plaintiffs, the court's analysis reflected a primary concern
with the intentions of the board in approving the most recent permit
to ascertain if impermissible conduct took place. 78 As in Bean, the
court in East Bibb followed the equal protection analysis established
by the Supreme
Court in Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Devel79
Corp.
opment
Recognizing that the placement of the landfill in a predominantly
black census tract would necessarily have a disparate impact, the
court countered that the placement of a previous landfill in a predominantly white census tract nearby mitigated claims of racial bias
in the Commission's decision.8 0 The adjoining census tract was
much smaller with a majority white population; however, both tracts
were located in a 70% majority black voting district." The court
also kept its analysis limited to facilities approved by the commission, just as the district court had in Bean. Looking at the specific
census tract of the existing facility without regard for the census
tracts relationship to the larger community and area around it, the
court found that no racial bias was associated with the new facility
despite its placement in the predominantly black voting district with
other unwanted facilities. 83 If the Bean and East Bibb cases appear
to turn on the plaintiffs failure to persuade the court that a significant enough disparity exists to constitute an equal protection violation under Arlington Heights, the following decision will show that
the significance of the disparity has not been determinative in envi84
ronmental justice cases.
R.I.S.E. v. Kay, Inc., provides one of the best examples of the futile
nature of past environmental justice equal protection litigation. 85 In
that case, plaintiffs alleged that the proposed facility was the fourth
placed in an almost exclusively black area, and that the sole facility
placed in a predominantly white area was closed due to the lowered
77. Id. at 881.
78. Id. at 884.
79. Viii. of Arlington Heights v. Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252
(1977).
80. E. Bibb Twiggs NeighborhoodAss 'n, 706 F. Supp. at 880-84.
81. Id. at885.
82. Id. See also Bean v. Sw. Waste Mgmt. Corp., 482 F. Supp. 673, 673-79
(Tex.1979).
83. E. Bibb Twiggs NeighborhoodAss 'n, 706 F. Supp. at 880-84.
84. R.I.S.E. v. Kay, Inc., 786 F. Supp. 1144 (E.D. Va. 1991).
85. Id.
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property values and the negative environmental affects that the facility would cause. 86 Although the court stipulated to the clear disparate impact of the decisions, it meticulously noted that the members
of the Board of Supervisors making the decision about the current
facility were not part of the Board when the first two facilities were
located.87 Although the court made no later reference to this fact, it
did decide that the plaintiffs failed to provide the necessary evidence
showing discriminatory purpose under Arlington Heights. 8 Instead,
the court explained that the Board members based their decision on
their concern for the economic plight of the entire county. 89 Moreover, the court made clear that "[T]he Equal Protection Clause does
not impose an affirmative duty to equalize the impact of official decisions on different racial groups. Rather, it merely prohibits government
officials from intentionally discriminating on the basis of
90
race."
Although the court here seems to have given short shrift to Arlington Heights, finding that the current disparity and historic discrimination were not enough to infer a discriminatory purpose and discounting evidence showing deviations from the standard decisionmaking process, this case best reflects what environmental justice
litigants' chances to succeed have been under an equal protection
based analysis. 91 Despite the Court's claim in Arlington Heights
that direct evidence of racial animus need not be provided to show
discriminatory purpose in the absence of racial classifications, the
opposite has proven true. 92 Absent evidence of racial animus, contemporary federal courts rarely invalidate government decisions
based on the consideration of multiple factors to establish an equal

86. Id. at 1148-49.
87. The court found that two members of the current board participated in
approving the third facility suggesting the limited significance of past board decisions in light of the changes in membership. Id.at 1148.
88. Id.at 1149-50.
89. Id. at 1150.

90. Id.
91. Id.
at 1149-50.
92. Viii. of Arlington Heights v. Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 266
(1977); see also Robert Nelson, To Infer or Not to Infer a DiscriminatoryPurpose: Rethinking Equal Prot. Doctrine, 61 N.Y.U. L. REv. 334, 341-42 (1986)
(citing recent cases which have ignored the Arlington Heights rule, instead requiring a showing of discriminatory intent or direct evidence of racial animus as an
absolute prerequisite to an equal protection claim).
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protection violation. 93 In fact, a string of decisions show the unstated but implicit contemporary presumption that in the absence of
explicit racial classifications or a direct link to past de jure segregation patterns, governments act without discriminatory purpose when
substantial evidence to the contrary is lacking. 94 This presumption
can create an insurmountable hurdle for environmental justice litigants who routinely lack direct evidence of racial animus. 95 Environmental justice and other litigants seeking to surmount the mount
of joy may find themselves trapped in a legal hell96occupied by the
spirits of past litigants who hoped for racial justice.
B.

Cases Under Title VI ofthe Civil Rights Act of 1964

In contrast to the cases above, the court in Dowdell v. City of
Apopka considered whether the disparity in funding municipal ser-

vices such as water distribution, sewerage facilities, and storm water
drainage to black and white residents by the City of Apopka constituted a violation of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment and Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. 9' Making
93. In R.I.S.E., direct evidence of racial animus may not have been enough as
plaintiff's appellate brief alleged that racially derogatory terms were used by both
a board member and a county official regarding the matter. Robert Collin, Envtl.
Equity: A Law and PlanningApproach to Envtl. Racism, 11 VA. ENVTL. L.J. 495,
532 (1992); see also Michael Selmi, Proving Intentional Discrimination: The
Reality of Supreme Court Rhetoric, 86 GEO. L.J. 279, 284-85 (1997).
94. Such cases using the Arlington Heights analysis include the following:
Atkins v. Robinson, 545 F. Supp. 852 (D.C. Va. 1982); Laramore v. Ill. Sports
Facilities Auth., No. 89 C 1067, 1996 WL 153672 (N.D. Ill. 1996); U.S. v.
Charleston County, 316 F. Supp. 2d 268 (S.C. 2003).
95. Luke W. Cole, Civil Rights, Envtl. Justice, and the EPA: The BriefHistory
of Administrative Complaints Under Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 9 J.
ENVWL. L. & LITIG. 309 (1994). Although litigants in Wash. Park Lead Comm.,
Inc. v. US. E.P.A. were able to withstand a summary judgment motion when they
alleged that a relocation decision perpetuated historic discrimination of a formerly
segregated housing project, the claim was voluntarily dismissed on appeal. No.
2:98CV421, 1998 WL 1053712 (E.D. Va. Dec. 1, 1998). For a contrary decision
consider, Broward Gardens Tenants Ass'n v. U.S. E.P.A., 311 F.3d 1066 C.A.1 1
(Fla. 2002). In BrowardGardens Tenants Ass'n, the court held that alleged violations of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment did not circumvent the ban on pre-enforcement review under the Comprehensive Envtl. Response Compensation and Liability Act (CERCLA). 311 F.3d at 1066.
96. For a contrary view, see Alice Kaswan, Envtl. Laws: Gristfor the Equal
Prot. Mill, 70 U. COL. L. REv. 387,456 (1999).
97. Dowdell v. City of Apopka, 698 F.2d 1181, 1181-82 (Fla. 1983).
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much of the racial disparity in the level of services available to residents, the court connected the city's disparate funding decisions with
the municipal ordinance mandating residential segregation prior to
1968.98 The court went on to note that the city's awareness that its
predominant funding of services for white neighborhoods would not
only result in a lack of services for black residents,
but constituted
99
purpose.
discriminatory
of
relevant evidence
I begin my examination of Title VI with a brief survey of Dowdell
as a case between the margins that also included an equal protection
analysis. Unlike the previous cases concerned with the allocation of
environmental permits and sites, this case related to the provision of
municipal services to plaintiffs.' 00 Using the Arlington Heights
analysis, the court in this case nonetheless found violations of the
Equal Protection Clause. 1' Rather than a broad exception to the
rule against finding equal protection violations in the absence of direct evidence, this case represents a strand of cases finding equal
protection violations when municipalities continue historic patterns
of discriminatory service provision. 102 In these cases, courts connect
the invidious purpose of historic de jure segregation with the contemporary denial of services, relating current patterns to past discriminatory ordinances.I°3 Because environmental decision making
falls outside the arena of conduct historically associated with discriminatory behavior, cases alleging purposive discrimination in that

98. Id. at 1184.
99. Id. at 1185-86. EPA attorney, Steadman Southall participated in early
efforts to resolve the dispute before the Dowdell decision. In discussions with the
author held in 1997 in Region Four, Southall noted the city used EPA funding to
develop its sewage treatment system and, that upon receipt of the grant, the city
committed to use the funds in a non-discriminatory fashion. Nonetheless, he
pointed out that the city's disparate funding practice took place despite his and
others' efforts to encourage them to fulfill their non-discrimination obligations as
an EPA grant recipient.
100. Dowdell, 698 F.2d. at 1181.
101. Id. at 1186.
102. Neighborhood Action Coal. v. City of Canton, Ohio, 882 F.2d 1012 (6th
Cir. 1989); Baker v. City of Kissimmee, 645 F. Supp. 571 (M.D. Fla. 1986); Ammons v. Dade City, Fla., 783 F.2d 982 (11 th Cir. 1986); Tinsley v. Kemp, 750 F.
Supp. 1001 (W.D. Mo. 1990); Midwest Comty. Council, Inc. v. Chicago Park
Dist., 98 F.R.D. 491 (N.D. I11. 1983).
103. Dowdell, 698 F.2d. at 1181. See infra Part III below for consideration of
why these cases of the 1970s and 1980s fit the definition of impermissible discrimination.
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process failed to find traction in the federal courts. 104 In light of
that difficulty, many claimants hoped to find relief under Title VI of
the Civil Rights of 1964 using a discriminatory effects standard of
proof found in the EPA's Title VI regulations. 0 5 This hope led
some claimants down, what proved to be, an equally futile judicial
tract.
In Chester v. Seif,residents of Chester, Pennsylvania, complained
that the Pennsylvania Department of Environmental Quality violated
Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 through the process it used
10 6
to grant a waste facility permit to Soil Remediation Services, Inc.
At the time of trial, Delaware County, Pennsylvania had a population
that was 86.5% white and 11.2% black. 10 7 Within Delaware County,
plaintiffs noted that the Chester Township had a population of 5,399,
of which 53.6% were black and 45% were white, and that the City of
Chester, had a population of 41,856, 65.2% of which were black and
33.5% of which were white.' 08 Residents and activists complained
that defendants' issuance of five waste facility permits in less than
ten years, which increased the permitted waste capacity in Chester
by over 2,000,000 tons per year had a discriminatory effect on the
predominantly black residents of the city of Chester.109 Plaintiffs
noted that the increased waste capacity did not include the permit
capacity of a sewage waste facility to treat 44,000,000 gallons 1of0
sewage and incinerate 17,500 tons per year of sewage sludge.
The plaintiffs contrasted this permitting pattern within Chester with
the two waste facility permits granted outside of Chester during the
same period."' These two permits were located in two predominately white census tracts with a capacity of 700 tons per year.112
Plaintiffs claimed that, "only two Census Tracts in all of Delaware
County contained more than one waste facility and both of these
were located in areas with populations that were predominately African-American.'" 3 In contrast, plaintiffs asserted that Delaware
104. See supra Part II.
105. See 40 C.F.R § 7 (1998).
106. Chester Residents Concerned for Quality Living v. Seif, 944 F. Supp. 413,
414 (E.D. Pa. 1996).
107. Id.at 414.
108. Id. at 413, n.1.
109. Id. at415.
110. Id.
111. Id.at 415-16.
112. Id.at415.
113. Id.
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County had 112 census tracts where white residents made up more
than 50% of the population; 8 of those had one facility and 104 had
none. 114
Further, the court acknowledged that the City of Chester has one of
the highest concentrations of industrial facilities in the state; it holds
numerous plants, it incinerates all the solid waste from Delaware
County, and 85% of Delaware County's raw sewage and sludge gets
treated there. 11' In Chester, many of the pollution sources are near
minority residential neighborhoods." 6 Within 100 feet of over 200
homes, a cluster of waste treatment facilities received permits for
operation. 117
At the district court level, the judge considered the claimants' evidence but granted a motion to dismiss because the complaint failed
to allege intentional discrimination."18 Citing the Supreme Court's
decisions in Alexander v. Choate119 and Guardians Ass'n v. Civ.
Serv. Comm'n of City of N.Y., 120 the court maintained that private
parties bringing suit under Title VI of the Civil Rights Act must
prove intentional discrimination even though federal agencies retained the ability to find violations of Title VI based solely on the
discriminatory effects caused by their grant recipients' programs. 121
On appeal, the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit reversed the
District Court opinion, holding that a private right of action existed
to bring an action under federal agencies' discriminatory effects
regulations. 122 This 1997 appeal remanded the case back to the Dis23
trict Court for disposition in light of the Appellate Court opinion. 1
Although Pennsylvania appealed the circuit court's decision to the
United States Supreme Court in 1998, the case ultimately resolved
when the Pennsylvania Department of Environmental Protection

114. Id at415-16.
115. Id at415.
116.
117.
118.
119.
120.

Id
Id
Id. at 417.
469 U.S. 287, 293 (1985).
463 U.S. 582 (1983).

121. Chester Residents Concernedfor QualityLiving, 944 F. Supp. at 417, n.5.
122. Chester Residents Concernedfor Quality Living v. Seif, 132 F.3d 925 (3d

Cir. 1997).
123. Id. at 927.
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revoked the waste permit at issue. 124 DEP revoked the permit at the
request of SRS after their initial time period to construct the facility
under the original air quality plan approval expired. 125 Under the
Title V program of the Clean Air Act, the facility would have been
required to submit a new air quality plan that met with the more
stringent regulations that had gone into effect. 126 In light of the permits revocation, the Supreme Court dismissed the state's appeal citing irrelevance and vacated the Appellate Court decision. 127
Nonetheless, the Supreme Court resolved the Title VI legal questions raised in Chester a few years later in Alexander v. Sandoval.12 8
Although the case took place outside of the environmental context,
the Court ruled that no private right of action existed for plaintiffs to
bring Title VI suits based on the disparate impacts caused by a federal grant recipient's program. 129 In the case, a 5-4 majority decided
that the plaintiffs class action suit against the Alabama Department
of Public Safety for its policy of limiting the Alabama Driver's license exam to English as a violation of the U.S. Department of
Transportation's Title VI regulations could not be sustained because
no private right of action exists
under the statute to enforce agency
0
regulations.13
impact
disparate
Despite the Court's decision in Alexander v. Sandoval, one glimmer of hope remained for environmental justice claimants seeking to
bring a civil rights action that did not depend on intentional discrimination. 13 ' The residents of the Waterfront South neighborhood
in Camden, New Jersey tested that hope when they filed an action
under U.S. Code § 1983 against the New Jersey Department of Environmental Protection. 32 The case, filed prior to the Supreme
124. Pa. Dep't of Envtl. Prot., Envtl. HearingBoardDismisses SRS AIR Appeal.
http://www.dep.state.pa.us/dep/DEPUTATE/polycomni/update/05-29-98/052998
u8.htm (last visited Mar. 26, 2007).
125. Id.

126. Id.
127. Seif v. Chester Residents Concerned for Quality Living, 524 U.S. 974

(1998).
128. Alexander v. Sandoval, 532 U.S. 275 (2001).
129. Id.
130. Id.
at 293.
131. Bradford C. Mank, Using Section 1983 to Enforce Title VI's Section 602
Regulations, 49 U. KAN. L. REv. 321 (2001).
132. S. Camden Citizens in Action v. N.J. Dep't. of Envtl. Prot., 145 F. Supp.
2d 446 (D.N.J. 2001) (§ 1983 providing in relevant part, "Every person who, un-

der color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State or
Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citi-
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Court's ruling in Sandoval, attempted to use the private right of action that exists under § 1983 to enforce the EPA's discriminatory
effect regulations.' 33 Claimant's initial complaint alleged that a proposed cement processing facility would cause a discriminatory impact on residents in violation of EPA's Title VI regulations.' 34 The
neighborhood hosted two Superfund sites, multiple abandoned
and/or contaminated industrial sites, chemical companies, waste facilities, a petroleum coke transfer station, and more permitted polluting facilities. 135 The plaintiffs further contended that the New Jersey
Department of Environmental Protection (NJDEP) granted additional permits for a regional sewage treatment facility, an incinerator, and a power plant in the neighborhood. 136 Consequently, the
claimants maintained that the Waterfront South community, made up
of 63% African-Americans, 28.3% Hispanics, and 9% white residents, hosted 20% of the city's contaminated sites and had more than
double the number of permitted air polluting operations than an area
within a typical New Jersey zip code.' 37 As relief, the South Camden Citizens in Action (SCCIA) sought to enjoin the issuance of the
air permit for the cement processing facility due to NJDEP's failure
to assess the disparate impact the facilities operation would cause. 138
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit reversed the District Court decision granting the injunction. 139 Specifically, the
court held that the District Court erred in finding it likely that the
plaintiffs would succeed on the merits of the case. 140 To support its
decision, the court looked to the reasoning of the majority in Alexander v. Sandoval, writing:

zen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and
laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other
proper proceeding for redress...." See 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Although plaintiffs initially filed suit under Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 at 42 U.S.C. § 2000d
to § 2000d-7, the District Court provided them with leave to amend the complaint
following the Court's ruling in Alexander v. Sandoval.
133. S. Camden Citizens in Action, 145 F. Supp. 2d at 509-10.

134. Id.
at 450-51.
135.
136.
137.
138.
139.
140.

S.Camden Citizens in Action, 274 F.3d 771, 775 (N.J. 2001).

Id.
Id.
Id. at 776-77.
Id. at 791.
Id.
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Inasmuch as the [Supreme] Court found previously that
the only right conferred by section 601 was to be free of
intentional discrimination, it does not follow that the right
to be free from disparate impact discrimination can be located in section 602. In fact, it cannot. In sum, the regulations, though assumedly valid, are not based on any
federal right present in the statute. 14 '
Although the analysis of the enforceability of the EPA's regulations under § 1983 was one of first impression, the court did its best
to ground its opinion solidly in the analysis of the Alexander v.
Sandoval majority opinion. 14 In doing so, the court required that a

clear congressional intention to prohibit disparate racial impacts be
present in the underlying statute that plaintiffs claim creates a right

enforceable under § 1983.143 Further, the court specifically rejected
arguments that agency regulations could form the basis for establishing enforceable federal rights under statutes that already establish
such rights.144 As a matter of policy, the court further supported its
decision based on the concern that the right to bring private suits
based on disparate racial impacts could have sweeping ramifications,
and therefore should be expressly provided by congressional action
rather than an interpretation by the courts. 145
The District Court ultimately resolved the case in 2006, five years
after the issuance of the original injunction. 146 In its decision, it ad141. Id, at 789-90.
142. Id. at 789, n.12.
143. Id. at 790. Because the majority in Alexander v. Sandoval had so recently
decided that no congressional intent to provide a private right of action based on
disparate racial impacts could be found in Title VI, the court used the same analysis to determine that Congress also lacked the intent to create a federal right that
persons be free from disparate racial impacts caused by the programs of federal
grant recipients.
144. Id.
145. The court writes, "[i]t is plain that in view of the pervasiveness of state and
local licensing provisions and the likely applicability of Title VI to the agencies
involved, the district court's opinion has the potential, if followed elsewhere, to
subject vast aspects of commercial activities to disparate impact analyses by the
relevant agencies... [w]hile we do not express an opinion on whether that would
be desirable, we do suggest that if it is to happen, then Congress and not a court
should say so as a court's authority is to interpret rather than to make the law." Id.
at 790.
146. S. Camden Citizens in Action v. N.J. Dep't. of Envtl. Prot., No. Civ. A.
01-702, 2006 W.L. 1097498 (D.N.J.) (Mar. 31, 2006).
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dressed the outstanding claim that the NJDEP intentionally discrimi47
nated against the residents of South Camden in issuing the permit.1
Under that analysis the court on remand rejected each of the plaintiffs' contentions that NJDEP purposefully granted the permit based
on the race of the residents. 148 The court went on to find the following:
When the Court grants all inferences in favor of Plaintiffs, including evidence of potentially discriminatory enforcement and of a foreseeable disparate impact, Plaintiffs still fail to establish that NJDEP issued permits to
SLC because of, not merely in spite of, its adverse effects
upon the minority community of Waterfront South. 149
South Camden, like the other cases surveyed, represents
the contem150
porary experience of many racial minorities today.

IV. FACING THE BROKEN BRIDGE - EQUAL PROTECTION

AND TITLE VI

JURISPRUDENCE

A.

EqualProtectionJurisprudentialTheory

A broad and deep literature has developed over the past three decades around antidiscrimination and equal protection jurisprudence. 15 1 Most of the articles of the time period attempt to make
147. Id at 1.
148. Id. at 36.
149. Id, (The court's decision falls squarely within the vast majority of race
based Equal Protection cases challenging race neutral policies decided over the
past thirty years. As in those cases, the Arlington Heights factors serve to justify
discriminatory racial impacts that result from facially neutral policies).
150. See infra Part l.
151. See Julie Chi-hye Suk, Equal by Comparison: Unsettling Assumptions of
AntidiscriminationLaw, 55 AM. J. COMP. L. 295 (2007); Stephen A. Plass, Privatizing AntidiscriminationLaw with Arbitration: The Title VII ProofProblem, 68
MONT. L. REv. 151 (2007); Samuel R. Bagenstos, The Structural Turn and the
Limits of AntidiscriminationLaw, 94 CAL. L. REv. 1 (2006); Gregory Mitchell &
Phillip E. Tetlock, Antidiscrimination Law and the Perils of Mindreading, 67
OHIO ST. L.J. 1023 (2006); Sheila R. Foster, Causationin AntidiscriminationLaw:
Beyond Intent Versus Impact, 41 Hous. L. REv. 1469 (2005); Viktor Winkler,
Dubious Heritage: The German Debate on the Antidiscrimination Law, 14
TRANSNAT'L L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 959 (2005); Ivan E. Bodensteiner, Review of
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sense of the Supreme Court's antidiscrimination jurisprudence under
the Equal Protection Clause of the United States Constitution, the
civil rights legislation of the 1960s or both.112 The constant theme
across the literature sounds in the reconciliation of the landmark
Brown v. Board of Education and its progeny with the subsequent

decisions of the Burger and Rehnquist Courts contracting the reach
and warrants for race based antidiscrimination findings.' 53 In this
section, the article explains the rejection of environmental racism
claims in the federal courts using democratic process and motive
review theory; the article strengthens this insight through consideration of the "perpetrator's perspective" of discrimination and the ethnic competition model of racial disparity used
by the Supreme Court
1 54
in its Equal Protection Clause Jurisprudence.'
Beyond the assertion that intentional discrimination is required to
prove a violation of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment or Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, this section
situates the level of intentionality required in the environmental decision making process along a continuum with other public decisions
and relates the level of intent required to constitute a violation to the
process used to authorize pollution in predominantly minority communities. Because racial disparity is relevant to courts' analysis of
racial discrimination under the Village ofArlington Heights, the sec-

tion also explains the ever decreasing significance of the disparate
impacts of environmental pollution to the outcome of federal "environmental racism" cases. This section culminates in the development
of an "environmental racism" rubric that classifies environmental
decisions based on their exposure to an equal protection challenge.
Specifically, the rubric charts the assortment of public environmental
decisions and the level of deference provided by courts together with
the evidentiary burden necessary to prove discriminatory intent.

David E. Bernstein's You Can't Say That! The Growing Threat to Civil Liberties
from AntidiscriminationLaws, 31 J.C. & U.L. 437 (2005); P.K. Runkles-Pearson,
The Changing Relations of Family & the Workplace: Extending Antidiscrimination Laws to Parentsand Nonparents Alike, 77 N.Y.U. L. REv. 833 (2002); Chetan
Gulati, Genetic AntidiscriminationLaws in Health Insurance: A Misguided Solution, 4 QUINNIPIAC HEALTH L.J. 149 (2001).
152. Most antidiscrimination scholarship falls into the later category, which
would be expected in light of the shared historical development of the two areas.
153. See sources cited supra note 151.
154. While these do not represent all of the mechanisms used to "make sense"
of the Court's decisions, they account for a substantial share of the commentary.
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Legal commentators' concern with the Supreme Court's increasingly restrictive exposition of the protections offered by the Equal
Protection Clause of the United States Constitution has dominated
journal articles on the subject for over thirty years.155 The articles
cover a range of approaches. While some commentators decry the
Court's turn away from the commitments of Brown and its progeny, 156 others challenge the Court's reliance upon "colorblind constitutionalism."' 157 A much smaller group commends the court for their
principled decisions 158 while others use psychological insights to
critique the Court's intentional discrimination standards. 159 This
section draw insights from an additional group of articles that endeavor to explain the Court's decisions based on an internal logic
0
woven through the cases and a broader jurisprudential analysis.16

155. See Michael Selmi, Proving Intentional Discrimination: The Reality of
Supreme Court Rhetoric, 86 GEO. L.J. 279, 284-85 (1997); David A. Strauss, Discriminatory Intent and the Taming of Brown, 56 U. CHI. L. REv. 935 (1989);
George Rutherglen, Symposium: The Jurisprudenceof Justice Stevens: Panel VI:
Equal Prot.: Disparate Impact, Discrimination, and the Essentially Contested
Concept of Equality, 74 FORDHAM L. REv. 2313 (2006); Olatunde C.A. Johnson,
Disparity Rules, 107 COLUM. L. REv. 374 (2007); Stacy E. Seicshnaydre, Is the
roadto DisparateImpact Paved With Good Intentions?:Stuck on State ofMind in
AntidiscriminationLaw, 42 WAKE FOREST L. REv. 1141 (2007); Daniel R. Ortiz,
The Myth of Intent in Equal Prot., 41 STAN. L. REv. 1105 (1989); Samuel Issacharoff, Making the Violation Fir the Remedy: The Intent Standard and Equal
Prot. Law, 92 YALE L.J. 328 (1982); Reva B. Siegel, Brown at Fifty: Equality
Talk: Antisubordinationand Anticlassification Values in ConstitutionalStruggles
Over Brown, 117 HARV. L. REv. 1470 (2004); Sheila Foster, Intent and Incoherence, 72 TUL. L. REv. 1065 (1998); Richard A. Primus, EqualProt.andDisparate
Impact: Round Three, 117 HARv. L. REV. 493 (2003).
156. See sources cited supra note 155.
157. Id.
158. See Richard McAdams, Cooperation & Conflict: The Economics of
Group Status Production and Race Discrimination,108 HARv. L. REv. 1003
(1995) (for an example from an interesting economic perspective).
159. See Charles R. Lawrence I1, The Id, the Ego, and Equal Prot.: Reckoning
With Unconscious Racism, 39 STAN. L. REv. 317 (1987); Charles R. Lawrence II,
Unconscious Discrimination Twenty Years Later: Application & Evolution, 40
CONN.L. REV. 931 (2008).
160. While other important articles offer viable accounts, their examination
extends beyond the scope of this article. See, e.g., Derrick Bell, Brown v. Boardof
Education and the Interest-Convergence Dilemma, 93 HARV. L. REv. 518, 533
(1980); Daniel R. Ortiz, The Myth ofIntent in Equal Prot., 41 STAN. L. REV. 1105
(1989); Reva B. Siegel, Brown at Fifty: Equality Talk: Antisubordination and
Anticlassification Values in Constitutional Struggles Over Brown, 117 HARV. L.
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Foremost are Motive Review and Democratic Process Theory.
This theoretical framework explains the deferential approach taken
by judges in reviewing Fourteenth Amendment Equal Protection
challenges to the decisions of legislative bodies and executive authorities. A key feature of this section is the specific application of
this theory to environmental decision making. The "Perpetrator's
Perspective" of racial discrimination and the ethnic competition
model of racial disparity are also integrated in order to contextualize
this "race neutral" mechanism for judicial review in light of two
dominant trends in Supreme Court race discrimination jurisprudence.
The product of this approach is the creation of an "environmental
racism" rubric that categorizes environmental decisions and the level
of deference the courts should provide with the level of evidence
required to prove an Equal Protection Clause violation.
The first of the three articles considered in this section is a seminal
work in Critical Race Theory by David Alan Freeman."' In Legitimizing Racial Discrimination through Antidiscrimination Law: A
Critical Review of Supreme Court Doctrine, professor Freeman

chronicles the twenty-five year history of Supreme Court decisions
on equal protection and racial discrimination.'
Professor Freeman's elaboration of two perspectives on discriminationperpetrator and victim-available to the Courts serves as one of the
articles central insights. 63 The perpetrator perspective understands
discrimination as discrete actions carried out by individual actors
against particular victims.164 From this perspective discrimination
appears as historic and isolated events. 165 America's history of slavery and Jim Crow segregation constitute irrelevant background fac66
tors under this view unless directly linked to the alleged violation. 1
In contrast, the victim perspective focuses on current social condiREV. 1470 (2004); Sheila Foster, Intent and Incoherence, 72 TUL. L. REV. 1065
(1998).
161. KIMBERLE WILLIAMS CRENSHAW et al., CRITICAL RACE THEORY: THE
KEY WRITINGS THAT FORMED THE MOVEMENT (New

Press 1996).

162. Although these articles and my analysis focus on the race cases under
equal protection they may offer a helpful background story to the Court's gender,
disability, and age jurisprudence.
163. Alan Freeman, Legitimizing Racial Discriminationthrough Antidiscrimination Law: A CriticalReview of Supreme Court Doctrine, 62 MINN. L. REV.
1049, 1057 (1978).
164. Id. at 1053-54.
165. Id. at 1053-55.
166. Id. at 1052-53.

80

FORDHAMENVIRONMENTAL LAW REVIEW

[VOL. XX

tions and their relation to historic mistreatment. 16 7 From the victim's perspective, discrimination problems cannot be resolved until
1 68
the conditions created by discrimination have been eliminated.
This view clearly contradicts the perpetrator perspective that construes the neutralization of the proscribed behavior as a remedy of
the established violation. 169
The twin concepts of fault and causation provide the strong structural artifice holding up the perpetrator perspective. 170 Fault allows
antidiscrimination law to single out bad actors traversing the society's norm of racial neutrality. 171 Through it, a large class of "innocents" is constructed who lack legal and moral responsibility for the
discriminatory results of their conduct because they act without a
desire to do so. 172 The social ramification of this perspective's
dominance can be seen in the resentment expressed by otherwise
"innocent" members of the racial majority when remedial measures
for historic discrimination such as affirmative action and reparations
are discussed. 173 A vision of America as an equal opportunity meritocracy only occasionally sullied by aberrant discriminating actors
emanates from this perspective. 174
Causation balances fault in the perpetrator perspective. 7 By requiring that a defendant's actions create a "discriminatory effect,"
causation places objective discriminatory conduct beyond the reach
167. Id. ("This perspective includes both the objective conditions of life-lack
of jobs, lack of money, lack of housing-and the consciousness associated with
those objective conditions-lack of choice and lack of human individuality in
being forever perceived as a member of a group rather than as an individual.").
168. Id.at 1053.
169. Id (Affirmative action and reparations, both largely unpopular with the
society's racial majority, grow out of this perspective.).
170. Id.at 1054.
171. Id.
172. Id. at 1055; see also Charles R. Lawrence III, The Id, the Ego, and Equal
Prot.: Reckoning with Unconscious Racism, 39 STAN L. REV. 317 (1987) (examining the prevalence and importance of unconscious bias in American society and
the impotence of current antidiscrimination law to address it).
173. See id. (While reparations programs are overwhelmingly rejected by
whites, affirmative action is disfavored by a majority of white Americans); see
also id. at note 83; Jeffrey M. Jones, Race, Ideology, and Supportfor Affirmative
Action, GALLUP, August 23, 2005, available at http://www.gallup.com/poll/
18091/Race-Ideology-Support-Affrimative-Action.aspx. ("Whites are much more
divided [than blacks], with opponents outnumbering supporters [of affirmative
action] by a 49% to 44% margin.").
174. Freeman, supra note 163, at 1054.
175. Id.at 1056-57.
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of legal protection when no unique harm befalls its victims. 176 This
explains why the Court could find no violation of the Equal Protection Clause when jurisdictions across the American South openly
closed down public facilities and services rather than provide them
to blacks on an equal basis. 177
Professor Freeman's article skillfully traces the Court's formalistic
adoption of the "perpetrator perspective" and the challenge it faced
in crafting remedies that correlated to the violations it identified that
did not overly embrace the "victim perspective."' 178 Professor Freeman accounts for dissonance in the Court's decisions in the twentyfive year period following Brown as the Court's ongoing efforts to
legitimize the continued material subordination of blacks in the
country while at the same time proscribing formal discrimination by
public officials. 179 Freeman marks the creation of remedies that offer the mirage of resolution without endorsing the "victim perspec180
tive" as no mean feat rather skillfully accomplished by the Court.
This article maintains that the perpetrator perspective provides the
framework courts begin with in investigating environmental racism
claims. Typically, environmental racism claimants bring cases based
on their perspective as victims of polluting facilities that operate outside of the bounds of their control. For some, their experiences as
racial minorities in the broader American society place them within a
historical narrative fraught with political neglect and economic exploitation. Redlining, housing discrimination, segregated schools,
and limited employment opportunities all color claimants perception
of the government and businesses in their communities. In contrast,
courts begin with a blind eye to these other factors. They focus almost exclusively on determining whether plaintiffs have presented
sufficient evidence that government actors acted with racial malice
in approving a commercial or public use of property or the release of
pollutants into the environment. For the courts, evidence must dem176. Id.(Freeman cites, as examples of this, the post-Brown cases upholding
state actions of closing public schools, swimming pools, and other segregated
public facilities, rather than complying with desegregation orders.); Palmer v.
Thompson, 403 U.S. 217 (1971); Evans v. Abney, 396 U.S. 435 (1970). A specific example in the environmental law context can be seen in E. Bibb Twiggs
Neighborhood Ass'n. v. Macon-Bibb County Planning & Zoning Comm'n, 706 F.
Supp. 880, 884-85 (M.D. Ga. 1989), af'd, 896 F.2d 1264 (11 th Cir. 1989).
177. Freeman, supra note 163, at 1057.
178. Id. at 1054-57.
179. Id.at 1050-51.
180. Id. at 1057.
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onstrate that one or more government officials, who are presumed
innocent, acted on racial rather than commercial or environmental
grounds in making a particular decision. Otherwise, officials will
lack fault for the disparate racial effects that may result from their
decisions. Moreover, the technical nature of environmental decisions considered in tandem with the commercial interests that typically drive them give officials a host of race neutral reasons to authorize the placement of polluting facilities in minority communities
and to grant pollution permit requests. Through the blinders of the
perpetrators perspective, environmental decision making seems less
likely to be associated with improper racial motives than many other
government actions regardless of the racial disparate effects associated with them because government actors lack "fault" for the disproportionate impacts that may result from their use of race neutral
decision making criteria. This perspective also means that courts
will discount pollution facilities and activities that impact whites and
racial minorities alike as evidence that race was not the basis of a
government decision. Even when the particular harm risked or exposure experienced by racial minorities is higher than that facing
their white counterparts, courts will view the impact on whites as
evidence that something other than race "caused" the alleged harm.
Sheila Foster provides the critical explanation of the Court's equal
protection jurisprudence, for the purposes of this article.18 1 In Intent
and Incoherence, Professor Foster provides a cogent analysis of the
Court's equal protection decisions by applying "motive review theory" and its antecedent "democratic process theory" to explain the
seeming dissonance of the Court's decisions. 182 The article speaks
directly to the divergent levels of consciousness required by the
Court to satisfy the discriminatory
intent standard applied to the
83
Equal Protection Clause. 1
Refining, extending, and critiquing the arguments advanced by
Daniel Ortiz in the Myth of Intent in Equal Protection, Professor
Foster posits the coherence of Supreme Court equal protection decisions when viewed in light of "institutional process and substantive
concerns." 184 Under process theory, the Court self consciously exer181. See Foster, Intent andIncoherence,supra note 155 at 1065.
182. Id. at 1070-71.
183. Id. at 1069. (This consciousness can range from a specific desire to harm
the affected group, to general knowledge that harm is substantially certain to occur, to an unconscious bias towards the affected group.).
184. Id. at 1121-25.
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cises "judicial restraint" when examining executive and legislative
actions.1 85 This deference supports the Court's majoritarian preference for democratic policy decisions. 186 By restricting its role to
examining the legitimacy of the process followed by its fellow
branches, the Court avoids "substituting its policy preferences for
those of other, more representative and accountable actors." 187 As a
"counter-majoritarian" institution, l18 under process theory, court
decisions overturning the actions of other branches absent the violation of "clear and determinative constitutional provisions" represents
the frustration rather than the furtherance of American democracy.1 89
Motive review theory envisions the Court as the "corrector of democratic process defects." 190 Racial prejudice and bias represent
improper legislative and administrative motives that corrupt an otherwise democratic process; when these are found present in the motivation of governmental actors courts properly withhold judicial
deference and apply judicial scrutiny to remedy the defective process. 191 Ortiz shows that the Court uses the intent requirement to distinguish the protection of "political, criminal, and educational rights"
from the protection of "social and economic goods, like jobs and
housing" as a way of facilitating liberalism's commitment to the protection of individual choice in a societal area relegated to "market
control."' 192 Applying this reasoning, the Court's decision to distin185. IdatlO-01.
186. Id.at 1101-02.
187. Id.at 1102.
188. For a contrary view of the Court's counter-majoritarian nature inrace
cases, see Girardeau A. Spann,Proposition209, 47 DuKE L.J. 187, 278-86 (1997)
(examining the Supreme Court's role as a majoritarian institution insignificant
cases involving the rights of blacks and other minorities); Carlton Waterhouse,
Avoiding Another Step In A Series Of Unfortunate Legal Events: A Consideration
Of Black Life Under American Law From 1619 To 1972 AndA Challenge To Prevailing Notions Of Legally Based Reparations, 26 B.C. THIRD WORLD L.J. 207
(2006) (exploring the role of law in the historic mistreatment of African Americans).
189. Foster, Intent andIncoherence, supra note 155 at 1101-02.
190. Id.at 1102.
191. Id.at 1102-03.
192. Daniel R. Ortiz, Myth of Intent in Equal Prot., 41 STAN. L. REv. 1105,
1141-42 (1989) ("In making this distinction, intent doctrine reflects our prevailing
political ideology-liberalism-which isa system of values rooted inthe belief that
the state should allow every individual to pursue his own perception of the good.
Since such an aim requires the state to remain neutral between competing conceptions of the good, the state can legitimately act only to allow individuals more
fully to pursue their own private conceptions ....
Remaining social interaction is
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guish the standard for establishing an equal protection violation from
that used under Title VII in the case of Washington v. Davis falls
into place. 193 Unlike voting, school desegregation, and jury selection cases where the Court allows a finding of discriminatory intent
with something less than a showing of motivation, housing and employment cases under equal protection require a higher evidentiary
burden to limit judicial intervention in these otherwise market controlled areas. 194
Using Motive Review Theory, Foster extends Ortiz's work showing that the degree of consciousness required to cause an Equal Protection Clause violation varies within the areas identified by Ortiz as
requiring a showing of discriminatory motivation. 95 She explains:
The degree of judicial restraint is linked, in turn, to the
ability of disparate impact evidence to trigger the demand
for a justification from the decisionmaker. In other
words, as the reasons for judicial deference decline, the
relevance of disparate impact to the intent inference escalates. This evidentiary variation, in turn, significantly determines the degree of consciousness-or level of intent
that can violate the Equal Protection Clause. As a result,
the intent doctrine can be conceptualized along a continuum, instead of a bright line, separating196the decision's
impact from the decisionmaker's intent."
Democratic process concerns, institutional competence, and a decision's potential burden on a challenger's political or fundamental
rights sway the Court's evidentiary requirements in equal protection
cases. 197 Democratic process concerns-Foster's "democratic validation concerns"--reflect the Court's respect for the superior policy
governed by free markets since that mechanism is thought best to allow persons to
achieve their individually chosen objectives in free trade.").
193. See Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976); Vill. of Arlington Heights
v. Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252 (1977) (requiring that plaintiffs meet the
substantial evidentiary burden of showing the defendants discriminatory motivation).
194. Foster, Intent andIncoherence,supranote 155 at 1098-99.
195. Id. at 1098-99.
196. Id. at 1121. The level of judicial restraint depends on the right affected by
the decision, the decision maker's relation to the democratic process, and the nature of the decision being made. Id.
197. Id.
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making authority of the executive and legislative branches based on
their electoral accountability through the democratic process. 198
Institutional competence considerations involve the Court's deference to the executive and legislative branches but differ from democratic process concerns. Decisions involving an executive or legislative branch exercise of "core constitutional duties" along with those
related to specific expertise of the decision maker represent judgments reflecting particular competencies of the decision makers and
not the Court thereby justifying a higher evidentiary standard for
plaintiffs to prove intent.199 Potential burdens on a challenger's political or fundamental rights can provide a basis for lowering the evidentiary burden of the challenger in light of the substantive rights at
issue.200 By weighing these three factors, the Court shifts the level
of consciousness required to violate the Equal Protection Clause
along the continuum.
Legislative and executive policy decisions beyond the scope of
fundamental or political rights make up one end of the continuum.202
The Court provides the highest level of judicial deference in these
cases--"super restraint"--refusing to interject their judgment absent
a showing of specific intent to harm. 0 3 At the opposite extreme, the
Court applies "minimal restraint" as the lowest level of judicial deference.
In these cases, the Court will require a justification from a
government decision maker after a showing of substantial administrative discretion and a disparate impact.205 Between these extremes,
the Court applies "intermediate restraint., 20 6 Under this analysis, the
198. Id.at 1101-02.
199. Id. at 1124-25.
200. Id.at 1125-28.
201. Id.at 1121-22.
202. Id.at 1122.
203. Id.
204. Id.at 1132-34.
205. Id. Jury cases based on peremptory challenges and the challenge to the
key man system for grand jury selection used in Texas make up these cases. Castaneda v. Partida, 430 U.S. 482 (1977). The lower standard for these cases results
from the Court's protection of the Sixth Amendment right of the defendant, the
increased institutional competence of the Court to review the decision, and the
decreased democratic process concerns in reviewing decisions of administrative
bodies. Foster, Intent and Incoherence, supra note 155 at 1132-33. Unlike the
actions of directly elected legislators and some executive branch personnel, administrative agency policy decisions warrant decreased democratic process concerns.
Id.at 1128-31.
206. Foster, Intent and Incoherence, supranote 155, at 1127-28.
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Court may supplement its review of the decision maker's stated rationale with consideration of the social and historical context of the
decision. 207 If a finding of general intent is made then the Court will
also find a decision presumptively unconstitutional absent a justificatory showing by the decision maker. 20 8 Using this approach, the
Court distinguishes the level of intentionality required for equal protection violations-placing a high burden on parties claiming violations resulting from legislative or executive decisions over economic
and social issues that do not implicate substantive rights.2 °9
This article places environmental decisions into the continuum of
government decision making developed by Foster. Unlike government action that involves a fundamental right like voting or jury selection, courts view environmental decisions as market based actions
that require plaintiffs to meet a higher evidentiary standard of intent
or consciousness for proof. This flows from the lower constitutional significance accorded burdens associated with nonfundamental rights.
Institutional competencies further support
higher standards of intent in environmental decision making cases
for administrative agency and quasi-legislative bodies. Administrative agencies follow highly technical and race neutral federal and
state environmental guidelines in making their decisions to grant or
deny pollution permit requests. Staffed with scientists and engineers
tasked with evaluating a permit applicants compliance with technical
standards, administrative agencies have specialized knowledge that
courts lack. Courts, in turn, defer to these special competencies and
require a higher burden of proof to show that an agency acted with a
discriminatory intent. Likewise, local land use decisions made by
quasi-legislative bodies with the authority to grant or deny particular
land uses receive deference from courts. Both democratic process
concerns and institutional competencies support court deference to
these bodies. County commissions, city councils, and similar bodies
reflect local democratic decision making by voters regarding local
land use policies and implementation. Courts defer to the actions of
these bodies based on democratic process concerns, as such. However, many local bodies have been elected with the particular purpose of balancing the economic needs of local communities with the
interests of commercial entities. Courts see these bodies as exercis207. Id. at 1128.
208. Id.
209. Id. at 1098-99.
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ing particular competencies to weigh the competing interests of their
communities in economic and other matters. In turn, courts afford
deference to these bodies' special abilities to ascertain and act in the
best interests of local citizens. Based on this deference the local land
use decisions of these entities warrant a higher evidentiary burden on
plaintiffs that members acted with racial malice.
Matthew J. Lindsay provides the final analytical model, examined
in this section. 2 1 In his recent article, How AntidiscriminationLaw
Learned to Live with Racial Inequality, Lindsay explores the Courts

move from concern with racial disparity as indicia of discrimination
in the Civil Rights Era to a doctrine of colorblind competition that
explains economic, educational, and other racial disparities in society as a reflection of ethnic differences resulting from racially neutral market based meritocracy. 211 Lindsay maintains that following
passage of the Civil Rights Act of 1964212 antidiscrimination law in
the federal courts can be divided into three periods: the Civil Rights
Era; Colorblind Equality; and Colorblind Competition. 213 This article considers each period proposed by Lindsay 214
for the luminary spotjurisprudence.
protection
equal
on
casts
light it
From 1965-1971, federal courts and the United States Department
of Justice sought ways to put the new antidiscrimination laws fully
into practice. 2 15 The justice department, the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, and others looked to racial proportionality in
21 6
employment as a means to evaluate compliance with Title VII' s
antidiscrimination requirements for the workplace.21 7 The underlying logic commonly employed by the courts and federal officials was
that absent racial discrimination blacks and other racial groups
2 18
would experience proportionate representation in the labor force.

210. Matthew J. Lindsay, How Antidiscrimination Law Learned to Live with
Racial Inequality, 75 U. CIN. L. REv. 87 (2006).
211. Id. at88-90.
212. Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000 et seq. (1964).
213. Lindsay, How Antidiscrimination Law Learned to Live with Racial Inequality, supra note 210, at 88-92.
214. See infra notes 216-250 and accompanying text.
215. Lindsay, How Antidiscrimination Law Learned to Live with Racial Inequality, supra note 210, at 93-95.
216. Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000(a) (1964).

217. Lindsay, How Antidiscrimination Law Learned to Live with Racial Inequality, supra note 210, at 95-100.
218. Id.
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In response to concerns that more affirmative steps were required
to facilitate a non-discriminatory and hence representative workforce, President Lyndon Johnson began and President Richard Nixon
continued city based initiatives in federal contracting. 219 These programs required that the construction industry and its unions create
hiring plans that would allow them to reach certain levels of minority representation.220 When challenged, the federal courts upheld
these programs using the same logic that applied to the ongoing Title
VII cases-absent discrimination blacks would have proportionate
representation in desirable jobs. 221 In Griggs v. Duke Power the
Supreme Court weighed in and held that a racial disparity in the
workforce based on facially neutral hiring criteria was sufficient to
show discrimination and to establish a violation of Title VII unless
222
the employer could connect the criteria with a business necessity.
Reflecting the logic of the lower courts and federal officials of the
time, the Court viewed the employer's lack of black employees in
certain positions resulting from its facially neutral criteria as indicia
of discrimination requiring a justification by the employer.223
The next period, in Lindsay's analysis reflects the federal courts
turn away from racial discrimination as the cause of racial disparity
in education, employment and other aspects of society. 224 Justice
Powell's opinion in Regents of the University of Californiav. Bakke
provides the quintessential expression of the reasoning behind the
social and legal turn away from expectations of racial proportionality. 225 Powell's opinion stands out in the landmark plurality decision for crafting the diversity rationale for affirmative action recent
upheld in Grutter v. Bollinger.226 Upon investigation, Powell's
opinion also stands out for reformulating the Court's understanding
of racial disparity in American society and its relationship to dis-

219. Id. 98-100. See PHILIP RUBIO, A HISTORY OF AFFIRMATIVE ACTION 149156 (Univ. Press of Miss. 2001), for a discussion of these initiatives and other
aspects of affirmative action's development during this period.
220. Lindsay, How Antidiscrimination Law Learned to Live with Racial Inequality, supra note 210, at 99-100.
221. Id. at 100-04.
222. Id. at 104-07; See Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971).
223. Griggs, 401 U.S. at 429-30.
224. Lindsay, How Antidiscrimination Law Learned to Live with Racial Inequality, supra note 210, at 109-15.
225. Regents of Univ. of Ca. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978).
226. Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 (2003).
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crimination. 227 As Lindsay points out, 228 Powell leaves the original
purpose and understanding of the Equal Protection Clause as providing freedom and protection to the slave race to the universalized
purpose of providing protection to what had become "a nation of
minorities."
In making this turn Powell, recast the preceding two
hundred and forty four year history of legally proscribed subjugation
and subordination of American blacks 2 0 preceding the civil rights
movement with the experience of discrimination against ethnic immigrants.231 By defining America as a "nation of minorities" and
equating blacks experience with that of other more successfully assimilated immigrants 232 Powell argues that the "white majority" consists of a range of ethnic immigrants who are equally threatened with
discrimination from governmental actors seeking to remedy
the ef2 33
fects of past discrimination by whites against other groups.
Connecting Powell's argument with the writings of colorblind advocates of the time, Lindsay illustrates the twofold effect of the argument.

234

He elaborates:

227. Lindsay, How Antidiscrimination Law Learned to Live with Racial Inequality, supra note 210, at 110-12.
228. Id.
229. Regents of Univ. of Ca., 438 U.S. at 291-93.
230. Not to mention the conquest of its Native Americans.
231. Regents of Univ. of Ca., 438 U.S. at 292. He writes, "Each had to struggle-- and, to some extent, struggles still -- to overcome.. .prejudices. Id. at 292. A full
examination of the validity of this claim is beyond the scope of this article. The
experience of Jewish immigrants fleeing Nazi persecution, Vietnamese immigrants
escaping the Killing Fields, and Cubans departing Castro's Cuba to come to the
United States, however, seems of a different type than that of Native Americans
and blacks whose primary experience of persecution came from the colonial, state,
and federal governments as well as its diverse citizens pursuant to its laws. For
these groups, America beckoned not for their "tired poor and huddled masses
yearning to be free." See Carlton Waterhouse, Avoiding Another Step in A Series
of Unfortunate Events, 26 B.C. THIRD WORLD L.J. 207, 227-250 (2006), for an
examination of the significant role of law in the historic mistreatment of African
Americans.
232. In the opinion Powell notes, "Jews, Catholics, Italians, Greeks, and Slavic
groups, continue to be excluded from executive, middle-management, and other
job levels because of discrimination based upon their religion and/or national origin." Regents of Univ. of Ca., 438 U.S. at 293.
233. Id. at 294.
234. Lindsay, How Antidiscrimination Law Learned to Live with Racial Inequality, supra note 210, at 113-14.
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First, it suggests that African Americans will follow a
path of ethnic progress comparable to that of their immigrant forebears--the Irish, eastern European Jews, Italians, Japanese, and the like. Second, it accounts for racial
inequality as an expression of ethnically distinctive culture or taste. Racial inequality is thus tolerable because it
is temporary and bound to be diminished with each generation; but even if it persists, it is merely a natural manifestation of black ethnic difference. Under this model,
the goals of the civil rights movement have already been
satisfied, notwithstanding apparent evidence to the contrary; all that remains for antidiscrimination law is to police against the isolated, exceptional acts of illicit discrimination perpetrated by a handful of racist throwbacks to the Jim Crow era.
Each of these points corresponds to contemporary and popular
views of racial discrimination.
Overt discrimination's substantial
diminution and the continued disparity in the educational and economic achievement of black, Latino, and Native Americans find
ready explanation in the "culture of poverty" arguments popularized
in the 1980s and still very relevant today. 23 The implicit irony of
the second point Lindsay identifies above is that adherents both espouse "colorblindness" and the essentializing arguments of racial
difference that ascribe positive and negative stereotypes to racial
minorities and ethnic groups to explain their relative successes and
failures in society. 238 The first point, of course, reflects the huge
235. Id.
236. Id, See also JOHN MCWHORTER, LOSING THE RACE: SELF-SABOTAGE IN
BLACK AMERICA (The Free Press 2000), and THOMAS SOWELL, BLACK REDNECKS
& WHITE LIBERALS (Encounter Books 2005).
237. The thesis maintains that the disparity in economic and educational
achievement of blacks, Latinos, Native Americans, and other groups results from
their failure to assimilate the positive norms of American society rather than discrimination. SOWELL, BLACK REDNECKS & WHITE LIBERALS supra note 236. A
second extension of the argument is manifested in less popular genetic inferiority
claims.
RICHARD J. HERRNSTEIN & CHARLES MURRAY, BELL CURVE:
INTELLIGENCE & CLASS STRUCTURE IN AMERICAN LIFE (Free Press Paperbacks
1994).
238. Lindsay, How Antidiscrimination Law Learned to Live with Racial Inequality, supra note 210, at 117-18; see ROSALIND S. CHOU & JOE R. FEAGIN, THE
MYTH OF THE MODEL MINORITY: ASIAN AMERICANS FACING RACISM (Paradigm
Publishers 2008); see also FRANK WU, YELLOW: RACE IN AMERICA BEYOND
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paradox at the heart of the argument-blacks, whose arrival predated
that of the immigrants they are compared to by one to two centuries
will succeed just as their predecessors did.2 39
Lindsay tracks the second thesis through a series of Court decisions to show its prevalence in the Court's Title VII and equal protection analysis.2 40 In the Title VII context, the courts in Watson242
v.
24 1
Fort Worth Bank and Trust and Wards Cove Packing v. Atonio

reject the reasoning used in Griggs and its progeny that the lack of
racial proportionality in the work place could rise to the level of a
Title VII violation. In these cases, the majority rejected the argument that racial disparity reflected racial discrimination that required
an employer to show that it was precipitated by "business necessity"
as established by Griggs.43 The Ward's Cove case represented a
particularly strong expression of the thesis as Justice O'Connor
deemed the ultra segregated positions, dining, and living quarters
between whites and Alaskan natives as reflections
of racial differ244
significance.
legal
of
devoid
inclinations
ence and
In its seminal equal protection cases, the Court even more keenly
reflected the "racial difference" argument initiated in Bakke. 245 City
of Richmond v. Croson, represents the next step in the Court's break
with its approach adopted in Griggs explicitly reasoning that gross
racial disparity 246 in the construction field in Richmond, Virginia did

BLACK AND WHITE

(Basic Books 2001) for an investigation of the pitfalls for

Asians and other groups of accepting the label that they represent "model minorities" in American society who demonstrate the systems racial impartiality through
their success.
239. Acceptance of this proposition while encouraging to some reflects a historical understanding of society that avoids the economic, educational, political,
and psychological consequences of three centuries of collective experiences prior
to the passage of the civil rights act of 1964. Lindsay, How Antidiscrimination
Law Learned to Live with Racial Inequality, supra note 210, at 123-24.
240. Id. at 124-34.
241. See Watson v. Fort Worth Bank and Trust, 487 U.S. 977 (1988).
242. See Wards Cove Packing Co., v. Atonio, 490 U.S. 642 (1989).
243. Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 431-32 (1971).
244. Wards Cove Packing Co., 490 U.S. at 642.

245. Id.
246. In this case, it represented the near exclusion of blacks as prime contractors in the industry. The city council's study revealed that blacks made up less
than 1% of the City's construction contracts and 50% of the city's population.
City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 479 (1989).
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not suggest the presence of racial discrimination. 247 In the plurality
opinion, Justice O'Connor, dismisses the uncontested statistical evidence, testimony of witnesses, and findings of the United States
Congress relied upon by the city council that racial discrimination
against blacks was characteristic of the construction industry. 248 In
this regard, O'Connor expresses the underlying view subsequently
applied to the federal government in Adarand v. Pena that existing
racial disparity in the market place can only be correlated with discrimination through specific and direct evidence of discriminatory
acts.249
The model of ethnic competition rationalizes courts decreased reliance on disparate effects as evidence of improper racial motives. In
environmental racism cases, polluting facilities and other environmental disamenities are disproportionately located in black and Latino communities. Though relevant, under the Village of Arlington
Heights, to prove racial discrimination disparate environmental impacts lack the gravity required to offset the high evidentiary burden
required to prove intent by quasi-legislative bodies and administrative environmental agencies. Even stark racial disparities are likely
to be dismissed by courts as the result of free market land use decisions by residents and commercial entities. Moreover, the ethnic
model of competition suggests that the racial disparities associated
with blacks and Latinos today will likely dissipate over time as
blacks and Latinos integrate into the society as other ethnic groups
have. Under this reasoning, racial clusters and communities fit the
paradigm of ethnic enclaves that decrease in significance as subsequent generations enjoyed increased opportunities within the broader
society. The prevalence of environmental pollution sources in these
communities, from this perspective, fails to implicate an improper
racial motivation by government actors. More often than not, the
free market will be seen as the reason for racial disparity based on

247. O'Connor states, "the statistics comparing the minority population of
Richmond to the percentage of prime contracts awarded to minority firms had
little or no probative value in establishing prior discrimination." Id. at 503.
O'Connor's opinion in Wygant v. Jackson Board of Education, 476 U.S. 267, 294
(1977), (foreshadows the more elaborated view that she adopts in Croson).
248. City of Richmond, 488 U.S. at 499.
249. See Adarand Constr., Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200 (1995) (requiring the
"strictest judicial scrutiny" of racial classifications by Congress even when intended to remedy past discrimination.).
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the availability of land and the depressed rent that residents may enjoy.
B. Equal ProtectionJurisprudentialTheory and Environmental
Justice
Environmental justice cases fall typically within the level of what
Foster identifies as intermediate restraint. These claims brought under the Equal Protection Clause seek to overturn state agency decisions regarding the adequacy of a party's pollution permit request on
the grounds of racial discrimination.
Rather than alleging that
state actors selected facility locations with the specific intent to adversely affect a particular racial group, plaintiffs routinely allege that
state actors granted permit requests without regard to the discriminatory effect of their decision. 251 Although environmental permitting
decisions are made by administrative entities rather than legislators
or high-level executive officers, they fall clearly within the realm of
economic ordering governed by the market.252 They largely result
from requests for permits from commercial entities engaged in business activities. As a matter of geography, state and federal permits
rarely relate to local land use decisions beyond minimum technical
standards of ecological suitability and compliance with local land
use laws. Consideration of the racial makeup or identity of persons
in near proximity to facilities is absent from the state and federal
government permitting process. The identity of persons residing
near facilities is simply a matter of the housing market divorced
from governments' operating practices.
Based on the above perspectives on the Court's equal protection
jurisprudence environmental justice claims, have little chance of
success absent a specific showing of racial discrimination 253 by the
250. See supra text accompanying notes 52-96.

251. Id.
252. Environmental permit decisions routinely reflect the market forces driving
local land use for both public and private entities. FRANK ACKERMAN & KEVIN
GALLAGHER, G-DAE WORKING PAPER No. 00-05: GETrING THE PRICES WRONG:
THE LiMITS OF A MARKET-BASED ENVTL. POLICY 10 (Tufts Univ. Oct., 2000),
available at ase.tufts.edu/gdae/publications/priceswrong.PDF.
253. In these contexts, historic discrimination requires more than past disparity.
Covert or overt racial discrimination typically associated with segregation era
racial bias will be required rather than facially neutral decisions that have a disparate racial impact. See Dowdell v. City of Apopka, 698 F.2d 1181 (Fla. 1983);

Fortson v. Dorsey, 379 U.S. 433 (1965).
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permitting agency in its past decisions and a level of intentionality in
the current decision beyond awareness of disparate impacts. 254 In
the absence of direct evidence of improper racial motive the courts'
approach should roughly conform to the following chart:
DECISION
MAKER/
DECISION 255

DEFERENCE
LEVEL 256

EVIDENTIARY
BURDEN

DISPARITY
EVIDENCE 257
REQUIRED

Agency-Executive/ High
Technical

High

Highly Disparate
Racial Impact

AgencyExecutive/NonTechnical

Intermediate

Intermediate

Significant Disparate
Racial Impact

Elected Board/
Technical

High

High

Highly Disparate
Racial Impact

Elected Board/
Non-Technical

High

Intermediate

Substantially
Disparate Racial
Impact

254. See sources cited supranote 151.
255. See Mark D. Rosen, The SurprisinglyStrong Case For Tailoring Constitutional Principles, 153 U. PA. L. REv 1513 (2005) (discussing the theoretical basis
for tailoring constitutional principles to different levels of government). See also
Norman R. Williams, Rising Above Factionalism,69 N.Y.U. L. REv. 963 (1994)
(contending that the Court should consider both the governmental agent making
decisions and the procedure it followed during its judicial review). Technical
decisions under this approach represent those based in scientific or technical proficiency beyond the expertise of judges. See Chevron U.S.A. v. Natural Resources
Defense Council, 467 U.S. 837, 865 (1984).
256. See Sidney A. Shapiro and Richard E. Levy, Heightened Scrutiny of the
Fourth Branch, 1987 DUKE L. J. 387 (1987) (arguing that the separation of powers
doctrine underlying court deference to agency actions also places a check on administrative conduct).
257. This column presumes the use of indirect evidence of racial motive contemplated by the Court in Vill. of Arlington Heights v. Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp.,
429 U.S. 252, 255 (1977) in conjunction with statistical data. Under this approach,
the significance of racially disparate impacts is weighted along with other evidence of racial discrimination in assessing an alleged equal protection violation.
See Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 241-242 (1976) (discussing the use of
statistical data to ascertain a discriminatory purpose under the Equal Protection
Clause).
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Agency Officer/
Technical

Intermediate

Intermediate

Significant Disparate
Racial Impact

Agency Officer/
Non-Technical

Low

Low

Significant Disparate
Racial Impact or
Highly Disparate
Racial Impact Alone

The highest evidentiary burden will be seen in the decisions of
elected boards and executive level agency directors making technical
decisions. These decisions require the greatest deference to in order
to protect the democratic process that responds to the policy choices
of elected officials. In order to prevail in such cases, claims relying
on circumstantial evidence have a high bar that requires a highly
disparate racial impact in addition to evidence of an improper racial
motive. This high burden is required to overcome courts' reluctance
to interfere in the decisions of elected officials without direct evidence of an impermissible racial motive characteristic of the dejure
legislation of the pre-civil rights era and the affirmative action programs of the last three decades. In the absence of direct evidence, a
combination of a high level of racial disparity and additional evidence from which the court can readily infer a discriminatory purposeful should meet the courts demands.
Elected boards making non-technical decisions make up a unique
class of decisions. In these cases, a high level of deference ought to
be provided the elected bodies absent direct evidence of racial motive, however, because the decision is non-technical fewer institutional competency concerns constrain the courts. Boards issuing
decisions based in technical criteria warrant more restraint from
courts than others. This distinction is reflected in a distinct evidentiary burden in these cases that requires that a substantial racial disparity be shown together with evidence of a racial motive. By requiring a substantial disparity along with racial motive evidence, this
intermediate burden falls between the lowest and highest evidentiary
requirements reflecting an appropriate deference to elected officials
policy judgments when presented with fewer institutional competency concerns.
Executive level agency directors making non-technical decisions
and non-executive level agency officials making technical decisions
make up the next level which merits an intermediate level evidentiary burden. In each of these cases, claims relying on circumstantial
evidence will require a significant disparate racial impact plus evi-
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dence of an improper racial motive. Although the evidentiary burden and the deference provided by the court are the same for both of
these cases, the rationale differs. Executive level agency directors
making non-technical environmental decisions warrant less deference from the courts based on the non-technical nature of their considerations and the courts ability to evaluate the grounds of the challenged decision. In turn, a lower evidentiary burden is called for to
infer a discriminatory purpose. When a non-executive agency officer renders a decision based on technical criteria the court should
also apply an intermediate level of deference based on the technical
nature of the officer's decision and the institutional competencies it
reflects; in these cases an intermediate evidentiary burden will require that a significant racial disparity be shown in addition to racial
motive evidence.
The lowest level of deference and the lowest evidentiary burden
coincide when non-elected agency officers make non-technical decisions. These judgments raise the fewest institutional competence
concerns as a result of their non-technical nature and warrant the
least amount of deference from the courts based on the non-elected
and non-executive position of the decision maker. These matters
call for the greatest inquiry by the courts and the highest sensitivity
to the racial disparity of decisions. At this level, an inference of discriminatory purpose can be raised by significant disparate racial impacts together with racial motive evidence and in some cases highly
disparate racial impacts alone. By recognizing the different levels of
evidence required and deference warranted courts gives meaningful
expression to both democratic process concerns and institutional
competencies while continuing to examine executive and legislative
branch decisions for the taint of invidious racial discrimination that
offend our constitutional protections.
This foregoing theoretical analysis of the Court's Equal Protection
Jurisprudence conforms to the decisions in the environmental justice
258
cases brought under the Equal Protection Clause discussed above.
In Bean, the court eviscerated the claimants' disparity claim by distinguishing the actions of the Texas Department of Health and the
Texas Department of Water Resources.
While the claimant alleged that the TDH had continued the historic discriminatory pattern
258. See supra text accompanying notes 52-96.
259. See Bean v. Sw. Waste Mgmt. Corp., 482 F. Supp. 673, 677-79 (Tex.

1979).
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of the TDWR, the court maintained that as distinct agencies their
actions should not be considered together. 260 This distinction plays
out in similar ways in the other cases as well.261 The Court in East
Bibb began its analysis, like the court in Bean, removing the landfills
placed in black communities by another body from the disparity
analysis.2 62 After doing so, the court found that no significant disparity existed.263 In R.LS.E. v. Kaye, the Court rejected evidence
that all but one of the landfills placed in the county were located in
black communities partially on the grounds that only two commissioners who approved only one of the three other landfills currently
served on the commission. 264 This approach falls squarely within
the "perpetrator's perspective." 26 5 Courts, when evaluating discriminatory effects, consider the actions of only one agency instead
of the cumulative effect of multiple agencies. 66
Environmental justice decisions can also be explained under democratic process and motive review theory. 267 Under those theories, courts will defer to the judgment of legislative bodies and highlevel executive officers to exercise judicial restraint to protect democratic values.2 6 8 The environmental cases above reflect the decisions of state administrative officers or county commissioners.269
Motive review theory counsels distinct approaches under each of
these two governmental bodies. 27 For the administrative decision
maker, the issuance of a permit follows a highly regulated technical
review process. 271 Generally, permitting authorities grant environmental permit requests unless applicants fail to satisfy pre260. Id.
261. E. Bibb Twiggs Neighborhood Ass'n. v. Macon-Bibb County Planning &
Zoning Comm'n, 706 F. Supp. 880 (M.D. Ga. 1989), aff'd., 896 F.2d 1264 (11th
Cir. 1989).
262. Id. at 1266.
263. Id.at 1267.
264. R.I.S.E. v. Kay, Inc., 786 F. Supp. 1144, 1149-50 (E.D. Va. 1991).
265. See Freeman, supranote 163.
266. Alan Freeman, Legitimizing Racial Discrimination through Antidiscrimination Law: A Critical Review of Supreme Court Doctrine, 62 MINN. L. REV.
1049, 1054 (1978).
267. Foster, Intent andIncoherence,supra note 155 at 1100-02.
268. Id.
269. See supra notes 52-151 and accompanying text.
270. See supra text accompanying notes 52-151.
271. ABA, THE LAW OF ENVTL. JUSTICE: THEORIES & PROCEDURES TO
ADDRESS DISPROPORTIONATE RISKS 473-81 (Michael B. Gerrard ed., NYU Press

2001) (1999).

98

FORDHAMENVIRONMENTAL LA W REVIEW

[VOL. XX

established federal or state criteria. 2 72 Unless these criteria include
community input or "environmental justice" as considerations,
agency decision makers typically express the view that they lack the
authority to deny a permit if 273
it otherwise complies with state and
requirements.
technical
federal
Courts reviewing these permitting decisions under an equal protection analysis will defer to the technical judgments of agency authorities absent evidence of a specific discriminatory intent.
Under
motive review theory, these decisions can warrant a high level of
deference. 275 The particular institutional competencies involved and
the limited discretion of the decision makers, for some executive
decisions, call for courts to use "super restraint" since neither political nor fundamental rights are involved.276 Exercising this high
level of restraint, courts will not overturn the decisions of a highlevel administrator unless presented with evidence of a specific intent to discriminate.277 Administrative agencies' decisions to grant
permits, despite discriminatory effects rather than
due to them ac278
cordingly, fail to demonstrate the requisite intent.
In South Camden Citizens in Action v. N.J. Department. of EnvironmentalProtection,, the District Court denied plaintiffs' claim that
the NJDEP violated § 1983 by granting a pollution permit to a cement processing facility in a minority community already burdened
with multiple polluting facilities without assessing the disparate racial impacts it would cause. 279 The District Court held that plaintiffs
failed to show that the agency granted the permit because of rather
than in spite of the disparate racial effects. 28 In essence, the court
found no specific intention to discriminate by the department and

272. See Cole & Foster, supra note 65, at 103-21 (for a discussion of the role of
the opportunities and limits of public participation within the environmental deci-

sion-making context).
273. Id. at 75-76. Consider the position adopted by the Michigan Department of
Environmental Quality in NAACP-Flint County Chapter v. Engler, Genesee
County Cir. Ct., 95-38228-CV.
274. Foster, Intent andIncoherence,supra note 155.

275. Id. at 1122-28.
276. Id.
277. Id.
278. S. Camden Citizens in Action v. N.J. Dep't. of Envtl. Prot., 274 F.3d 771,
775 (2001); see also supra note 151.

279. S. Camden Citizens in Action, 274 F.3d at 775.
280. See supranote 151.
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absent such a finding saw no basis to hold that the agency violated §
1983.
Quasi-legislative bodies with discretion to approve or deny local
land use decisions lack the restrictions placed upon administrative
agencies. 28 ' These voting bodies can weigh a host of considerations
in their decision-making. 282 Under Motive Review Theory, the increased discretion these bodies enjoy; warrants a decreased level of
deference from courts in light of the increased opportunity for improper considerations to affect members' judgment. 2 83 However,
those bodies making local land use decisions will likely receive
greater deference from courts in light of democratic process concers and courts' preference that local elected officials make decisions about local land use.28 4 Court decisions in these cases then will
continue to reflect the "super restraint" shown to technical administrative agency decisions only finding racial discrimination when
provided with evidence of "specific intent" by the decision making
body.285

In Rise v. Kaye, the county commission's decision to grant a permit request for an additional landfill in a black neighborhood despite
the exclusive location of the county's three other operating landfills
in black communities received great deference from the court. Attributing little significance to the disparate impact of the decision,
the court found that the commission's motivation was the economic
well being of the entire county and not the race of the community
where the facility would be located.286 Consistent with motive review theory, the court looked to the decision of the commission with
substantial deference to their stated rationale for the land use decision. 287 Without evidence that a specific intent to discriminate
281. See generally Cole and Foster, supra note 65.
282. See R.I.S.E. v. Kay, Inc., 786 F. Supp. 1144, 1150 (E.D. Va. 1991) (noting
the number of factors considered by the Board including the economic environmental and cultural needs of the country); E. Bibb Twiggs Neighborhood Ass'n. v.
Macon-Bibb County Planning & Zoning Comm'n, 706 F. Supp. 880, 882-84
(M.D. Ga. 1989), affd., 896 F.2d 1264 (11th Cir. 1989) (outlining the broad range
of considerations in the Board's decision making process), and Foster, Intent and
Incoherence, supra note 155 (discussing the significance of legislative versus administrative decision making bodies under the democratic process theory).
283. See Foster, Intent andIncoherence,supra note 155 at 1065, 1132-34.
284. Id. at 1102-03.
285. Id. at 1122.
286. Id. at 1150.

287. Id.
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guided the commissioners, the court
gave little consideration to
288
claimant's allegations of racial bias.
In each of the aforementioned court decisions plaintiffs alleged a
disparate racial impact of the decision, specifically that one or more
minority groups residing nearby suffered a disparate effect of the
requested pollution permit.28 9 The analytical model of ethnic competition provides significant insight into contemporary views of the
federal courts regarding racial disparities related to the social and
economic market place. 290 Absent evidence that government actors
purposefully intended to discriminate against parties because of their
race, the disproportionate effects of government decisions on particular racial groups that otherwise reflect market based choices and
competition will only rarely implicate a violation of the Equal Protection Clause. 291 This has broad ranging implications for environmental justice advocates, activists, and would be litigants. 292 The
Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution, Title VI of
the Civil Rights Act of 1964, and § 1983 of the United States Code
offer protection against mere racial disparity in pollution exposure,
facility siting, or the negative effects of federal or state pollution
permits in only a small category of cases with highly disparate racial
impacts.293 Further, it is extremely unlikely that the EPA's regulations proscribing such disparities will be used to invalidate a state
permit decision absent overwhelming evidence that permitting officials acted in bad faith in making a permit decision.294 Racial disparity based on de facto residential segregation patterns will rarely if
288. Id. at 1149-50.
289. See Foster, Intent and Incoherence, supranote 155 at 1065.
290. See Lindsay, How Antidiscrimination Law Learned to Live with Racial
Inequality,supra note 210.
291. Certain decisions are relegated to the markets, not to the courts. See Lindsay, How AntidiscriminationLaw Learned to Live with Racial Inequality, supra
note 210, at 115. , and Foster, Intent andIncoherence,supra note 155 at 1110.
292. See supra notes 214-250 and accompanying text.
293. See Sean-Patrick Wilson, Fighting the Good Fight: The Role of Envtl.
Civil Rights Litigators Going Forward and the Need for a Continuance of the
Litigation Tool in the Envtl. Justice Movement, 28 W. NEW ENG. L. REV. 293
(2006); Uma Outka, Envtl. Justice and the Problem of the Law, 57 ME. L. REV.
209 (2005), and Kyle W. La Londe, Who Wants to be an Envtl. Justice Advocate?:
Options for Bringing an Envtl. Justice Complaint in the Wake of Alexander v.
Sandoval, 31 B.C. ENvTL. AFF. L. REV. 27 (2004).
294. See generally Michael Zywicki, Scalia Envtl. Justice Movement,
www.vjel.org/editorials/pdf/ED10033.pdf. (to date, the EPA has never invalidated
a state permitting decision based on its Title VI regulation).
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ever lead to civil rights violations under the courts contemporary
analysis that accepts racial disparity as an expression of the preferences, values, and abilities of the diverse racial and ethnic groups
that make up American society. 295 From this perspective, perceived
environmental injustices reflect the function of the market place and
not the racial biases of local, state, or federal officials responsible for
making environmental decisions.296 Successful cases based on disparity alone will require evidence of highly disparate racial impacts
that lack an environmental justification.
Under the "perpetrator's perspective," disparities in alleged pollution exposure constitute unfortunate circumstances, but responsibility should not be placed on the "innocent" government or commercial actors who will routinely act without racial animus or discriminatory intent. 297 Using motive review theory, it appears that only
two small categories of environmental decisions will typically violate the Equal Protection Clause as the institutional competencies
and the democratic process preferences call for deference by courts
that lead to a high evidentiary burden for litigants to prove decision
makers acted with racially discriminatory motives.2 9 8 Non-technical
decisions made by elected bodies that include evidence of racial motive and a substantial disparate racial impact and non-technical decisions made by lower level agency officials that include evidence of
racial motive and a significant disparate impact or highly disparate
impact alone require the lowest level of deference and the least evidentiary burden. In these cases, courts ought to afford less deference
and conduct a more searching review of the decisions rendered. Evidence of racial motive and statistically significant disparity should
lead to a searching examination of the proffered explanation of
agency officials.
Likewise, highly disparate impacts of non-technical decisions
made by agency officials warrant a searching review even without
evidence of racial motive. To afford the same level of deference to
295. See Lindsay, How Antidiscrimination Law Learned to Live with Racial
Inequality, supra note 210, at 87.
296. See Vicki Been, What's Fairness Got to Do With It? Envtl. Justice and the
Siting of Locally UndesirableLand Uses, 78 CORNELL L. REv. 1001 (1993); see
also Vicki Been & Francis Gupta, Coming to the Nuisance or Moving to the Barrios? A Longitudinal Analysis of Envtl. Justice Claims, 24 ECOLOGY L.Q. 1
(1997) (for a discussion of the limitations of market-based decision making).
297. See Freeman, supra note 163, at 1049.
298. See infra notes 303-305 and accompanying text.
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the non-technical decisions of unelected officials as that provided the
technical decisions of elected officials would not represent a protection of the democratic process but a relinquishment of the courts responsibility to see that laws are faithfully executed in accordance
with the constitutional constraints of the Equal Protection Clause.
Of course, direct evidence of racial animus by a decision maker of
the type associated with the Jim Crow South should end the deference afforded by courts on technical and political grounds and require a searching review of any environmental decision.
The judge's statement quoted above in South Camden Citizens in
Action captures society's current view toward racial minorities' allegations of discrimination today-unless you can show that the challenged actions resulted from overt racial animus, the perceived infringement warrants neither moral nor legal sanction. Along with
the jurisprudential analysis above, a historical analysis of the civil
rights movement at its close clarifies the courts' rejection of environmental justice claims based in civil rights legal theories.299
V. CROSSING HELL'S BASEMENT - RACIAL ALIENATION WITHOUT

RACIAL AmMUS
In most respects, the de facto segregation in housing and public
education experienced by African Americans today is no different
than it was on Chicago's Westside in 1966 during SCLC's campaign. 300 Four decades later, segregation in housing and education
remain as fixed reminders that civil rights laws were embraced as a
popular means to eliminate the overt dejure segregation of the South
but not the covert defacto segregation of the North. More than any
other racial group, blacks today experience the highest level of racial
segregation in housing and education. 30 1 In a follow-up to the Kerner Report, the Eisenhower Foundation found that forty years after
the original Kemer Report 63% of African-Americans attended ra299. See discussion infra notes 298-314 and accompanying text.
300. At the close of the Chicago campaign the lead local organizer who had
implored Dr. King to come and offer assistance was distressed by the fact that
"there may never be an answer" for the type of discrimination that they faced.
Oates, supranote 3, at 418.
301. See Freeman, supra note 163, at 1057; Orfield, G. and Lee, C., Racial
Transformation and the Changing Nature of Segregation. Cambridge, MA: The
Civil Rights Project at Harvard University 4, 9, 18 (2006), available at
http://www.civilrightsproject.ucla.edu/research/deseg/Racial-Transformation.pdf.
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cially segregated schools compared with 67% in 1968.302 In housing, African Americans remain the most segregated members 3of3
0
American society despite modest gains over the past twenty years.
Despite these and other factors reinforcing the tenuous condition of
black communities across the United States from 1968 up to the present, claims that racial bias influences environmental decisionmaking have been consistently rejected.30 4
In the cases considered above, the predominantly AfricanAmerican communities in Flint, Houston, Macon, Danville, and
South Camden were victims of significant residential segregation
that resulted from a combination of private and public racially influenced decisions before and at the time the suits were brought.305 On
top of the residential segregation they experienced, these communities also suffered the adversity caused by multiple pollution sources
near and in their communities. 306 In an effort to gain relief, community members turned to the courts in the hopes of gaining the protection of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment
and Title VI of the Civil Rights Act. 30 7 Time after time and case
after case, however, federal courts could find no racial animus or
racial opprobrium and therefore no violation of the residents' rights
by public officials. 30 8 This phenomenon reflects the long term fail302. DAWAYNE WICKHAM & TUKUFU ZUBERI, KERNER PLUS 40 REPORT,
availableat http://www.ifajs.org/events/spring08/Kerner40/Report.pdf (last visited
Feb. 27, 2009).
303. JOHN ICELAND ET AL., U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, SERIES CENSR-3, RACIAL
1980-2000
AND ETHNIC RESIDENTIAL SEGREGATION IN THE UNITED STATES:
(U.S. Gov't Printing Office 2002), available at http://www.census.gov/prod/
2002pubs/censr-3.pdf (last visited Feb. 26, 2009).
304. See Freeman, supra note 163, at 1049.
THE
305. See ROBERT D. BULLARD ET AL., RESIDENTIAL APARTHEID:
AMERICAN LEGACY

49, 57, 62-63, 74-75 (CAAS Publications 1994), exploring the

contemporary dominance of de facto segregation in American residential patterns.
Bullard describes and explains the phenomenon that segregates Latinos and hypersegregates African Americans; see generally ROBERT D. BULLARD ET AL.,
HIGHWAY ROBBERY:

TRANSPORTATION RACISM AND NEW ROUTES TO EQUITY

(South End Press 2004) (discussing publicly funded segregation); JOE R. FEAGIN
& KARYN D. MCKINNEY, THE MANY COSTS OF RACISM 335-36 (Rowman & Lit-

tlefield Publishers, Inc. 2005).
306. CLIFFORD RECHTSCHAFFEN

& EILEEN GAUNA, ENVTL. JUSTICE LAW,

POLICY & REGULATION 334-349 (Carolina Academic Press 2002); Peter L. Reich,

Greening the Ghetto: A Theory of Envtl. Race Discrimination,41 U. KAN. L. REv.
271, 291-95,299, 301-02, 305, 311-2 (1992).
307. See Freeman, supra note 163, at 1057.
308. Id.
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ure of civil rights law to address a historic form of racial discrimination perpetuated through facially neutral policies. From the close of
the SCLC's Chicago Campaign to the present, the de facto segregation of American cities remains substantially intact. 30 9 Moreover,
contrary to prevailing notions that blacks have moved into the middle class and rendered racial discrimination concerns irrelevant, research indicates the contrary. In education and economic advancement, most black "middle class" children attend racially segregated
schools along with low-income blacks. 310 In economic terms, sixtynine percent (69%) of black children from the middle class fail to
exceed their parents' income in contrast with sixty-eight percent of
whites (68%) from the middle class who surpass their parents' income. 311 These statistics, along with many others, reflect the society's continued failure to respond meaningfully to the discrimination
concerns raised by Dr. King before his death and the Kemer Commission in their decisive report. 312 Despite the regular proof of continuing racial discrimination against blacks and other racial minorities in American society, in housing, employment, and other areas,
race-based civil rights law remains at the fringes of political and legal action with the exception of reverse discrimination claims
against parties seeking to remedy past discrimination. 313 The society
and the courts' sanction of discrimination, couched in facially neutral policies that hide ongoing conscious and unconscious racial bi-

309. See supra text accompanying notes 149-51; see also MARY PATILLOMcCoy, BLACK PICKET FENCES 30 (Univ. of Chicago Press 1999) for consideration of the tenuous nature of black "middle class" life in northern cities.
310. See sources cited supra note 306.
311. DEWAYNE WICKHAM, et al., KERNER PLus 40 REPORT (2008),
http://www.ifajs.org/events/spring08/Kerner40/Report.pdf.
312. The Kerner Report was rejected by then President Lyndon B. Johnson. Id.
at 78, 85.
313. Civil rights enforcement has continually declined over the past decades
despite numerous studies showing continued racial discrimination and rather consistent complaint levels. Reverse discrimination claims in contrast have occupied
increasing legislative, judicial, and executive attention over the last twenty years.
Consider Grutter v. Bollinger, 309 F.3d 329 (6th Cir. 2001); Gratz v. Bollinger,
188 F.3d 394 (6th Cir. 1999); Parents Involved in Community Schools v. Seattle
School Dist. No. 1, 127 S. Ct. 2738 (2007). Also note that Florida, California,
Michigan, and Washington have passed ballot initiatives proscribing affirmative
action and Arizona, Colorado and Nebraska are poised to vote on this issue in
2008.
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ases and prejudices,
precludes civil rights based attacks on environ314
mental injustices.
As the survey above indicates, civil rights laws have proven ineffective for communities claiming environmental injustice. 315 This
ineffectiveness reflects the stagnation of the society's interest in
eliminating the type of racism that the Kerner Commission found
caused urban riots in the middle to late 1960s. 316 Because environmental injustice claims typically correspond to the covert racial bias
associated with the American North of the late 1960s rather than the
overt racial discrimination of the Jim Crow South, the nation's antidiscrimination law serves as an ineffective weapon to challenge the
disparate racial effects of environmental decisions. However, before
abandoning hope altogether, environmental justice claimants may
consider the Environmental Justice Act of 2007 recently under consideration in the United States Congress as a backdoor out of the
inferno they have faced. Much like Dante's ultimate escape from
Hell, environmental justice claimants may find that they have descended so low in their legal journey that the only direction left to go
is up.
VI. UP FROM THE INFERNO - LEGISLATIVE LIGHT IN DARK PLACES

On February 15, 2007, Congressional representative Hilda Solis
from California's 32nd Congressional District introduced H.R. 1103
- Environmental Justice Act of 2007. 3' 7 On the same day, United
States Senator Richard Durbin introduced S.642 - identical compan314. Consider Adrian G. Carpusor & William E. Loges, Rental Discrimination
and Ethnicity in Names, 36 J. APPLIED SOC. PSYCHOL. 934, 934-952 (2006) (finding that housing owners provided a positive response to inquiries from rental applicants with names identified with African-Americans at a 56% rate compared
with a 89% rate for names identified with whites); see also Marianne Bertrand &
Sendhil Mullainathan, Are Emily and Greg More Employable Than Lakisha and
Jamal? A Field Experiment on Labor Market Discrimination(NAT'L BUREAU OF
ECON. RESEARCH, Working Paper No. 9873, 2003), available at
http://www.nber.org/papers/w9873.
315. See supra Part II.
316. REPORT OF THE NAT'L ADVISORY COMM'N ON CiviL DISORDERS 609 (Bantam
Books
1968),
available
at
http://www.eisenhowerfoundation.org/docs/Kerner.pdf.;
KERNER
PLUS 40
REPORT, http://www.ifaj s.org/events/spring08/Kerner4O/Report.pdf.
317. Envtl. Justice Act of 2007, S. 642, 110th Cong. (2007-2008) (a bill to codify Exec. Order 12898).
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ion legislation in the Senate. 318 These bills attempt to enshrine the
federal mandate penned by President William Jefferson Clinton in
319
Executive Order 12898 on Environmental Justice into federal law.
While it is beyond the scope of this article to undertake a comprehensive evaluation of the proposed legislation, this section briefly
raises some critical concerns regarding the proposed act. A more
detailed examination of the role of federal agencies in addressing
environmental justice concerns and the legal authorities to do so is
contemplated for further research. The section begins by examining
the existing executive order and its implementation by federal agencies; a consideration of some prominent limitations and likely challenges under the proposed act follows.
The core component of the Executive Order directs federal agencies to "identify and address... disproportionately high and adverse
human health or environmental effects of its programs, policies, and
320
activities on minority populations and low-income populations."
In addition, the Executive Order directs agencies to develop Environmental Justice strategies that list the "programs, policies, planning and public participation processes, enforcement, and/or rulemakings related to human health or the environment that should be
revised" pursuant to the dictates of the order. 321 Further, the Order
maintains the following:
Each Federal agency shall conduct its programs, policies,
and activities that substantially affect human health or the
environment, in a manner that ensures that such programs, policies, and activities do not have the effect of
excluding persons (including populations) from participation in, denying persons (including populations) the benefits of, or subjecting persons (including populations) to
discrimination under, such programs, policies, and 322
activities, because of their race, color, or national origin.
318. Id.
319. As officially titled "A bill to codify Exec. Order 12898, relating to environmental justice, to require the Administrator of the Envtl. Prot. Agency to fully
implement the recommendations of the Inspector General of the Agency and the
Comptroller General of the United States, and for other purposes." Id.
320. Exec. Order No. 12898, 3 C.F.R. 859 (1994) reprinted as amended in 42
U.S.C. § 4321 (2001).
321. Id.
322. Id.
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The preceding three provisions along with the requirement that
agencies "collect, maintain, and analyze information assessing and
comparing environmental and human health risks borne by populations identified by race, national origin, or income" form the bulk of
the substantive obligations of the Order. 32 3 As drafted, these four
provisions held considerable potential for addressing long and short
term concerns of environmental justice claimants and advocates.
Independently, each of these provisions could have significantly
changed the long or short-term experience of environmental injustice
faced by minority and low-income communities. Together, these
provisions should have radically transformed the way that both low
income and minority communities understood, related to, and were
impacted by local pollutions sources. From the EPA's far-reaching
pollution permitting programs to the Department of Transportation's
ubiquitous projects, the primary pollution sources affecting African
American and other communities fall under some federal program. 324 Accordingly, after fourteen years, agencies should be well
on their way to the resolution of a great number of environmental
injustices.
Sadly, agencies have achieved an uneven record, at best, toward
the directives of the Executive Order. 325 The agency with the most
significant environmental responsibility, the EPA, has been cited
repeatedly for its failure to follow the directives of the Executive
Order. 32 6 Instead of the systematic program analysis approach outlined by the Executive Order, the EPA has conducted an inconsistent
environmental justice program that readily raised public awareness,
participated in crisis management, and improved community relations but failed to systematically implement the directives of the Ex323. Id.
324. Steven A. Light & Kathryn R.L. Rand, Is Title VIA Magic Bullet? Envtl.
Racism in the Context of Political-EconomicProcesses and Imperatives, 2 MICH.
J. RACE& L. 1, 8, 44 (1996-1997).
325. Denis Binder, et al., A Survey of Fed. Agency Response to President Clinton's Executive Order No. 12898 on Envtl. Justice, 31 ENVTL. L. REP. 11133,
11149-50 (2001). See also, Meredith Judge Bowers, The Executive's Response to
Envtl. Injustice: Executive Order 12,898, 1 ENVTL. LAW 645, 656 (1995).
326. OFFICE OF INSPECTOI GEN., EPA NEEDS TO CONSISTENTLY IMPLEMENT
THE INTENT OF THE EXECUTIVE ORDER ON ENVTL. JUSTICE, REPORT No. 2004-P00007 ii 7 (2004); U.S. GOV'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, EPA SHOULD DEVOTE
MORE ATrENTION TO ENVTL. JUSTICE WHEN DEVELOPING CLEAN AIR RULES 3

(2005).
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ecutive Order. 327 While many of these failures reflect the limited
support in Congress and the White House for substantive changes to
the agency's approach to fulfilling its substantive statutory obligations, high-level agency management had differing views about the
role and standing of the program over the years. 328 Some agencies
have fared better in implementing the Executive Order, and others
have fared worse. 329 As a general matter, the limited success of
some agencies in implementing the Executive Order appears to flow
from the relative unimportance33that
agency executive's assigned Ex0
ecutive Order implementation.
The codification of the Executive Order provides an affirmation
from Congress that federal agency programs that spawn disproportionately high and adverse human health or environmental effects
have a legal obligation to identify and address them. 33 1 This codification speaks directly to the past neglect of environmental injustices
caused or perpetuated by agency programs by elevating the obligation above "agency management directives" to statutory responsibilities. 332 As statutory dictates, the above-stated provisions warrant
increased prioritization, funding, and implementation criteria rather
than a secondary responsibility that regulators jettison or disregard
when addressing primary commitments. Environmental justice obligations command heightened emphasis and attention under the proposed legislation as legally enforceable responsibilities.333 However, the elevated status offered by the Executive Order should be
seen as a minimal and moderate step by Congress to address this
issue. The proposed legislation introduces no new substantive obligations to federal agencies, instead requiring that agencies give more
weight to the obligations contained in the existing Executive Order.
Furthermore, the statute neither redefines nor restructures the
327. See supra note 323.
328. Id.
329. See A Survey of Federal Agency Response to President Clinton's Executive Order No. 12898 on Environmental Justice, XXXI Environmental Law Reporter 11133 (October 2001) (with Denis Binder, Colin Crawford, Eileen Gauna,
M. Casey Jarman, Bradford C. Mank, Catherine O'Neill, Clifford Rechtschaffen,
and Robert R. M. Verchick).
330. Id.
331. Exec. Order No. 12,898, 3 C.F.R. 859 (1994) reprintedas amended in 42
U.S.C. § 4321 (2001).
332. Id. at § 6-609.
333. See Envtl. Justice Act, supra note 314.
334. Id.
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requirements of the Executive Order. This allows agencies to
strengthen and expand existing programming as necessary to comply
with the codified obligations rather than creating a brand new set of
commitments. 335 In some cases, this may lead to an elevated status
for existing programs and greater attention to the dictates of the current Executive Order. Without more specific legislative direction,
however, it may result in few if any changes to some agencies' approach to the issue rather than the elevation of the issue that the proposed Act appears to intend.
More specifically, , as drafted, the Act retains a significant ambiguity that was present in the Executive Order; in the principle directive that requires agencies to "address" the environmental injustices
they "identify" without specifying how they are to do so. To be
more effective the proposed legislation should provide agencies with
greater direction regarding how they should address "disproportionately high and adverse" effects. While administrative law principles
dictate that each federal agency interpret this ambiguity through
regulation and rulemaking3 6such a gaping ambiguity potentially raises
non-delegation concerns.
In the absence of greater detail in a final version of the Act, agencies should re-evaluate their environmental justice strategies in
light of the legal elevation of the requirements. In conjunction with
the Department of Justice, agency General Counsel's should perform
an analysis of the legal authorities currently available to implement
the Act along with the necessary regulatory changes required to fulfill the new Congressional mandate. The EPA Office of General
Counsel orchestrated such an analysis following the issuance of the
Executive Order. The analysis detailed agency legal authority to
provide a robust implementation of the Executive Order including
regulatory and rulemaking changes. However, agency management
subsequently decided that the all but complete analysis be scuttled,
the process abandoned, and discussions ceased.33 7 The proposed
335. Id.

336. 3 KENNETH CULP DAVIS & RICHARD J. PIERCE, JR. ADMINISTRATIVE LAW
§ 1.7 (Little, Brown & Company 1994); see also Chevron USA v. Natural Res. Def.Council, 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
337. As a member of an agency-wide working group on environmental justice,
the author worked along with other lawyers across the agency to ascertain the legal
authorities available to implement the Order. The robust analysis identified scores
of existing legal authorities and appropriate regulatory actions to implement the
Order. The agencies decision to abandon this effort undercut the authority and
TREATISE

110

FORDHAMENVIRONMENTAL LA WREVIEW

[VOL. XX

legislation should engender a similar process across the covered
agencies that would meaningfully integrate environmental justice
into the legal framework of agencies' administrative regimes. Provision 6-608 in conjunction with the language of 1-10 1 seemingly contemplates no less in stating that agencies shall implement the mandate "to the extent permitted by existing law." 338 As a minimal and
moderate step, however, the Act may leave a vast expanse of
claimed environmental injustices untouched unless agencies reinterpret their obligations in light of the heightened legal bona fides of
the Executive Order's provisions created by the Act. 339 If agencies
move forward with regulatory development of the area, the administrative law process may resolve some of these issues, however, a
business as usual approach will offer communities little hope of
meaningful change. 3
One critical part of the re-evaluation that EPA, specifically, should
undergo must be to its Title VI program. Because the proposed legislation fails to address the Supreme Court's denial of private rights
of action under Title VI, claimants only recourse for redressing disparate racial impacts from federal grant recipient programs rest with
the EPA's Office of Civil Rights. Due to its small staff and limited
budget, the thorough investigation of complaints often precedes at a
glacial pace. 34 1 Under the proposed legislation, the EPA and other
status of the program despite attestations by EPA management that environmental
justice was an agency priority.
338. § 1-101 states, "To the greatest extent practicable and permitted by law,
and consistent with the principles set forth in the report on the National Performance Review, each Federal agency shall make achieving environmental justice part
of its mission..." Exec. Order No. 12,898, 3 C.F.R. 859 (1994) reprinted as
amended in 42 U.S.C. § 4321 (2001).
339. Some persons still debate the existence of environmental injustices as an
actual phenomenon. However, their approach to the question suffers from a fundamental flaw. Instead of viewing environmental injustice claims as the discrete
experiences of individuals that warrant consideration, they perceive the matter as a
phenomenon that only exists if universally experienced by a statistical majority of
the nation's minority and low-income populations. While this broad based analysis has value and evinces disturbing racial trends, it cannot determine the legitimacy of any single community's claims of environmental injustices. What may
not be a pattern in the Midwest can certainly be a recurring phenomenon in the
Southeast, and what may not be an ongoing phenomenon in the Northeast certainly
can still take place.
340. DAVIS & PIERCE, supra note 333 at § 1.7.
341. See Luke W. Cole & Caroline Farrell, StructuralRacism, StructuralPollution and the Need for a New Paradigm, 20 WASH. U. J. L. & POL'Y 265, 270
(2006).

2009] ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE AND EQUAL PROTECTION

111

federal agencies will be required for the first time to fulfill their Title
VI obligations in light of the agencies' detailed Environmental Justice Strategy and agency wide program evaluation. Rather than a
stand alone obligation unrelated to their environmental justice responsibilities, the proposed legislation could prompt agencies to
evaluate and consider Title VI as one of the means of implementing
the proposed legislation "to the greatest extent practicable and permitted by law." 342
One glaring limitation of the legislation is its neglect of the judicial
rejection of environmentally based discrimination cases. It neither
recognizes nor acknowledges the United States Supreme Court's
denial of private rights of action under Title VI in Alexander v.
Sandoval, a matter easily resolved through a simple legislative expression of intent to allow private citizens to use the discriminatory
effects standard found in agency regulations in their vrivate disFurther,
crimination suits brought against federal grant recipients.
the proposed legislation offers no civil rights protection against racial discrimination in environmental decision making by private or
non-funded public entities. Unlike the civil rights legislation passed
by Congress to address the panoply of discrimination issues in the
society, 344 the Environmental Justice Act of 2007 takes the modest
step of codifying the fourteen year old executive order that requires
federal agencies to identify and address their role in producing "disproportionately high and adverse" health and environmental effects
on "low income" and "minority populations." 345 To address environmental justice concerns effectively comprehensive legislation that
corrects the ambiguities of the existing Executive Order and provides greater direction to agencies regarding their responsibilities
will have to be passed. While the proposed legislation does elevate
the concerns of the existing Executive Order as a legal matter, it fails
to illuminate what role the federal government will play in addressing these concerns as a practical matter.
342. Exec. Order No. 12,898, supra note 317, at § 1-101.
343. This standard, used regularly by many federal circuits prior to the Court's
decision in Alexander v. Sandoval, would allow private citizens to bring discrimination claims under Title VI against state agencies that receive federal funds and
have methods of administering their environmental programs that have the effect
of discriminating based on race. 40 C.F.R. § 7.35(b).
344. Past civil rights legislation has proscribed race and sex discrimination in
public accommodations, employment, housing, and the use of federal funds.
345. Exec. Order No. 12,898, supra note 317, at § 1-101.
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VII. CONCLUSION

After going through Hell, environmental justice claimants have little hope of actually ascending to a point of recognition for their injuries and relief through the use of civil rights tools represented by the
Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and Title VI
of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.346 However, even Dante found a
narrow exit at the base of the Inferno that led the poet and his guide
to the base of Mount Purgatory, the next step in the traveler's journey toward the Mount of Joy. 347 Environmental justice claimants
may likewise find some glimpses of hope in the proposed Environmental Justice Act of 2007. Unlike the Courts' current construction
of relevant civil rights laws that only "purposeful" discrimination
warrants judicial recognition and redress, the proposed legislation
acknowledges the inadequacy of conducting federal programs in a
way that adversely affects minority communities at disproportionately high levels. 348 If passed this legislation may provide those
willing to continue on the narrow and arduous path through the painful purgatory of agency interpretation and implementation - a daunting but conceivable, upward path.
To ensure that the concerns of communities overburdened by pollution receive attention, however, Congress needs to act more intently. As a first step, Title VI should be amended to allow a citizen's filing suit to use the disparate impact standard found in the
EPA's administrative regulations. In so doing, Congress will allow
citizens to serve the important role of aiding the EPA in both monitoring and maintaining compliance with the established agency regulations. Further legislative action is also required to set health based
limits on the level of pollution discharged in residential communities. Because current EPA policies examine pollution permit requests on a discrete basis, multiple pollution sources can and do
overwhelm some residential neighborhoods irrespective of the cumulative risk that may exist. Thoughtful congressional action will
be required to protect communities irrespective of race from the potential health threats that can be created by this practice.
Communities would do well to focus their resources on claims
with highly disparate racial impacts resulting from non-technical
346. Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964,42 U.S.C. § 2000 (d).
347. ALIGHIERI, supra note 2.
348. Alexander v. Sandoval, 532 U.S. 275 (2001); Washington v. Davis, 426
U.S. 229 (1976).
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decisions made by agency officials. Even without evidence of racial
motive these cases merit a searching review. Likewise, nontechnical decisions made by lower level agency officials that include
evidence of racial motive and a significant disparate impact require
the lowest level of deference and the least evidentiary burden. These
cases may afford communities the relief they seek when brought
before the courts. Otherwise, persons concerned with disproportionate exposure to pollution should resist the temptation to challenge
environmental decisions on civil rights grounds without strong evidence of racial motive or a keen interest in joining other communities in an exit-less inferno.

